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International Law
Temple University School of Law
Degaris, Annesley

I. I Organizations

1. Security Council
(i) Maintain international peace and security
2. ICJ (only state to state disputes)
(i) Principal Judicial Organ à Dispute Resolution
(a) Requires both party’s consent
3. General Assembly
(i) Main deliberative organ
(a) Non-binding resolutions but formative influence
4. ILC – International Law Commission
(i) In charge of creating the articles that are eventually voted on
5. Thoughts
(i) If conflict b/w obligations of the UN and obligations under other international agreements à Obligations of the UN prevail (Article 103)
(a) Ex: Cyprus Conflict; Lockerbie

B. WTO (only state to state disputes)
1. Settles trade disputes
(i) Allows the winning party to impose sanctions on the losing party

C. NGO’s
1. Cannot bring disputes to ICJ or WTO b/c not a state

II.Introducing International Law

A. What is it? How does it work?
1. Actors à States; International Organizations, NGO’s
2. Dispute Resolution à Courts; Alternative Dispute Resolution
3. Legal System
(i) NO Central Law Making Authority
(ii) NO Central Judiciary w/ binding compulsory jurisdiction
(iii) NO Central executive branch

B. Chad/Libya Disputeà Who owns a strip of land?
1. Problem
(i) Actors are states
(ii) Dispute is over territory
(iii) The legal instruments they’re both relying on are formal à Treaties
(a) Why? à Treaties represent prior consent to certain rules
(b) France-Libya treaty
(1) The treaty constitutes formal acceptance by Libya of their borders
2. Procedure
(i) Armed Conflict à Submit it to ICJ à Decision for Chad à Libya pulls out

C. Rainbow Warrior à Transactional Dispute
1. Problem
(i) Greenpeace (NGO) had boat Rainbow Warrior destroyed by Secret Agents sent by France à Person was killed in the destruction
(a) Following Superior’s Orders are not a defense in International Law
(ii) New Zealand caught 2 of the agents, tried them, and convicted them
(iii) France wants them
2. Procedure
(i) Both states for the most part come up w/ an agreement, BUT, they don’t want it to look like they’ve politically come to an agreement
(ii) Submit dispute to UN Secretary General à Gives the looks of an Independent 3rd Party
3. Outcome
(i) UN claims that appropriate reparation is the condemnation of the French Republic for its breach of its treaty obligations to New Zealand, made public by the decision of the Tribunal

D. Why Comply?
1. Reputational Harm
(i) Signals to the rest of the world that you’re a law-abiding nation
2. Mutual Interests

Invalidating Treaties: Coercion and consent
(a) Article 51 à Coercion of a Representative or State (pg. 50)
(1) If your consent has been procured by acts or threats placed upon you then that signing and document do not have legal effect
(b) Article 52 à Coercion of a State by Threat or Use of Force
(1) Treaty is void if procured by threat or use of force

(iv) Good Faith Compliance
(a) Article 26 à Good Faith (pg. 58)
(1) Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed in good faith

(v) Limits on Treaties
(a) Article 53 à Conflicting w/ Preemptory Norm of International Law (pg. 58)
(1) Treaties are void if they conflict w/ norms that are accepted and recognized by the international community as a norm from which no derogation is permitted (jus cogens)
(b) Article 64 à Retroactive Confliction
(1) If there are new norms that emerge then any existing treaties in conflict w/ that new norm are void and terminated

(vi) Treaty Interpretation
Article 31à General Rules (pg. 61)