Civil Procedure
Mangold – Fall 2010
TIMELINE
Complaint
12(b) motions
Answer
Motions for voluntary or involuntary dismissal
Rule 16 scheduling conference and order
Discovery
Motions to amend
Settlement discussion
Motions for summary judgment
Rule 16 pretrial conference
Trial
Motions for directed verdict/judgment as a matter of law
Verdict
Entry of judgment
Motions for judgment n.o.v./judgment as a matter of law
Motions for a new trial
I. THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD
Right to a hearing – Due Process
1. 5th Amendment
2. 14th Amendment
TWO-PART INQUIRY: DUE PROCESS
1. Does this apply?
2. What process is due?
RULE 8 (p. 34) [General rules of pleading]
¨ Short and plain statement.
¨ Pleader entitled to relief.
¨ Demand for judgment.
¨ Pleading shall be simple, concise and direct; no technical forms of pleading or motions are required.
RULE 23 (p. 66) [Class actions]
¨ Class is numerous, joinder is not practical.
¨ Questions of law or fact common to class.
¨ Adequacy of representation.
¨ Typicality of claims.
GOLDBERG v. KELLY, 1978 [pre-termination hearing, welfare]
Issue: Whether the state can terminate pubic assistance payments to П w/out affording him an opportunity for hearing prior to termination denies due process and thus violates the due process clause of the 14th amendment. Constitutional issue reframed as: whether the DPC requires that the recipient be afforded an evidentiary hearing before or after termination of the benefits.
Remedy sought: injunction.
Facts: complaint brought by residents of NYC receiving financial aid under federal program AFDC alleging that NY state and NYC officials administering programs terminated, or were about to terminate, such aid w/out prior notice and hearing, thereby denying them due process of law. At time suit filed there was no requirement of prior notice or hearing of any kind before termination of financial aid. State’s Regulations amended after Пs initiated suit to include procedures for notice and hearing which provides for written notice prior to termination which may be supplemented by submission of a written statement by the recipient (informal pre-termination review). Recipients only have opportunity for hearing after termination as recipient may request a post-termination “fair hearing.”
Appellees’ Argument: there is an absence of any provisions for personal appearance of recipient before reviewing official, for oral presentation of evidence, and for confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses.
Δ’s Argument: argues that interests of appellees are outweighed by countervailing gov’tal interests in conserving fiscal and administrative resources; drain of finances of state; expansion of interpretation of 14th amendment.
Procedural Posture: Пs brought suit in District Court which held that only pre-termination evidentiary hearing would be sufficient to satisfy constitution and rendered judgment in favor of Пs
Reasoning: Some governmental benefits may be terminated w/out pre-termination evidentiary hearing; however due to crucial nature of welfare to its recipients as being the means by which to live, to deprive recipients of pre-termination hearing would not comport w/procedural due process. Also, written submissions are an unrealistic option for most recipients who lack education necessary to write effectively.
Holding: 1) Under Hannah, must balance interests of П w/ that of government. 2) This situation is important b/c affects very survival of individual. Kelly entitled to pre-termination hearing. Affirmed decision of District Court in favor of Kelly.
DISSENT: Will make it harder to get assistance; also invokes framers intent as civil war amendment.
CLASS COMMENTS ON CASE:
– Federal question case: What process is due? Specifically, was a pre-termination hearing due?
– Typicality requirement: Пs have different factual situations (i.e. some have notice, some not), however question of law in common.
– Пs’ lawyers attempt to paint sympathetic picture of П by including a lot of facts, etc.
– Law at issue: violates due process clause; should get written notice and prior hearing.
II. WHAT PROCESS IS DUE?
MATTHEWS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE v. ELDRIGE, 1976
Issue: whether the Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment requires that prior to the termination of Social Security disability benefit payments, the recipient be afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing (parties concede that DPC applies; instead question is “what process is due”?).
Facts: Respondent Eldridge received disability benefits under the Social Security Act and received a medical questionnaire for an update on his medical condition. He indicated that he had not improved and identified physicians from whom he had received treatment. The state agency then obtained reports from his physician and a psychiatric consultant, and determined that his disability had ceased in May 1972. The agency provided their reasons and also gave him an opportunity for reconsideration w/in 6 months.
Petitioner’s Argument: Eldridge’s benefits terminated according to valid administrative regulations; also that Goldberg does not control b/c social security benefits are different from welfare in that not based on financial need and issues of credibility and veracity do not play significant role in decision since in this case, turns primarily on medical evidence.
Reasoning: Government distinguishes this case from Kelly; interest is different b/c disability benefits are not based on financial need, therefore, there is not as much urgency. If these benefits are completely taken away from person, the person can always go on public assistance (i.e. welfare). Also written submissions as opposed to oral are ok in this situation (unlike Goldberg) b/c are relying most heavily on medical reports by physicians; therefore value of evidentiary hearing in this situation is less than in Goldberg. At some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative action and to society in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost.
3-PART TEST: 1) Private interest affected by action, 2) risk or erroneous deprivation of interests, 3) government’s interest and costs involved [public interest].
Holding: Evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of disability benefits and that the present administrative procedures comport with due process; judgment reversed in favor of petitioner.
DISSENT: focuses on 1st part of test.
PRACTICE EXERCISE: Designing a Sound Dispute Resolution Process (p. 59)
1.) Landlord-tenant
– prior record of conditions, agree to marks already present and both sign.
– Tenant can file in small claims court, but offers mediation w/landlord to avoid court.
III. REMEDIES
Power Of The Court
Courts May Order Remedies [such as]:
¨ $ damages.
¨ Orders directing Δ to cease offending behavior or undertake new behavior.
¨ Declarations of rights and duties.
* Can also order temporal relief before litigation is complete.
A. PROVISIONAL RELIEF
1. SECURING THE JUDGMENT – ATTACHMENTS, GARNISHMENTS & SEQUESTRATION
“Securing the judgement”
Lawyers want to “tie-up” Δ’s property, pending the outcome of litigation.
Lis pendens
Warning to anyone who may want to acquire an interest in the realty of the pending litigation that the attachment would prevent them from obtaining unburdened title to the property.
Sequestration
Seizing of property or $; compels public official to take Δ’s property to neutral location or cut off Δ’s access to funds or wages.
Sequestration – Benefits to П
1) Assurance that Δ’s resources will be available to collect if П wins lawsuit.
2) Puts pressure on Δ to settle – regardless of merits of case (cutting down $).
Receiver
An official designated by the court to “hold and manage property.”
Due Process Revolution
Established that 1) DP should be applied to prejudgment contexts; 2) insufficient procedural protections had previously been in place.
RULE 64 (p. 178) [Seizure of Person or Property]
Lack of uniformity considered; considered in conjunction w/state law – “in the manner provided by the law of the state in which the district court is held…”
RULE 69 (p. 185) [Execution]
Replevin, etc.
FUENTES v. SHEVIN, 1972
Issue: Whether the statutory procedures [involving seizures] under writ of replevin violate the 14th amendment’s guarantee that no state shall dep
order “payment of some or all of reasonable attorneys’ fees and other expenses” as sanction for filing unwarranted pleading or motion.
(a) Signature
(b) Representations to Court (pleadings should be non-frivolous, etc.)
(c) Sanctions
3. ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND SETTLEMENT
MAREK v. CHESNY, 1985
Issue: whether attorney’s fees incurred by a П subsequent to an offer of settlement under RULE 68 must be paid by Δ under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, when П recovers a judgment less than the offer.
Procedural Posture/Facts: 1) [Before trial] petitioner offered settlement of $100,000 (costs + attorneys’ fees) and respondent did not accept, 2) [Trial] respondent awarded total of $60,000, 3) [Post-trial] respondent file request for $171, 692.47 (costs + attorney’s fees), 4) district court decline to award respondent amt requested, 5) parties agreed pre-offer costs (inc. attorneys’ fees) was $32,000, 6) respondent appealed denial of post-offer costs, 7) court of appeals reversed in favor of respondent, 8) petitioner appealed.
RULE 68: if a timely pretrial offer of settlement is not accepted and judgment obtained by offeree is not more favorable than offer, offeree must pay costs incurred after making of the offer. [Purpose is to encourage settlement and avoid litigation.
Reasoning: 1) question raised whether “costs” in RULE 68 includes attorneys’ fees, and answer is yes; while framer did not explicitly define, it is reasonable inference. Application of this will serve as disincentive for П’s attorney to continue litigation after Δ makes a settlement offer. 2) Application of RULE 68 is consistent w/U.S.C. § 1988.
Holding: Petitioner not liable for costs of $139, 692 incurred by respondent after petitioner’s offer of settlement; judgment reversed in favor of petitioner.
DISSENT: drafters intend RULE 68 to have uniform application; “costs” mean only taxable costs (not attorneys’ fees).
IV. COMPLAINTS
CONLEY v. GIBSON, 1957
Issue: whether the complaint by petitioners adequately set forth a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Facts/Procedural Posture: 1) class suit brought in Federal District Court, 2) respondent moved to dismiss complaint, 3) district court granted motion to dismiss as adjustment board had jurisdiction over the matter, 4) petitioners appealed, 5) Court of Appeals affirmed. Complaint alleged that petitioner’s were discharged wrongly by the RR and that the Union refused to protect their jobs as it did w/those of white employees.
RULE 8(a): “short and plain statement of the claim.”
RULE 8 (f): pleadings construed as to do substantial justice.
Reasoning: RULE 8(a) does not require claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. Petitioners have adequately set forth a claim and respondents have fair notice.
RULE: a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that petitioner can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
Holding: judgment reversed in favor of petitioners.
Pleading Requirements under Federal Rules
Purpose is to screen out claims which lack merit – are they too lenient?
LEATHERMAN v. TARRANT COUNTY NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE & COORD. UNIT, 1992 [dogs & police]
Issue: whether П’s complaint satisfies the heightened pleading requirement; whether this heightened standard should be abandoned.
Facts: Shot two dogs (case 1) and hit 64 yr. old man (case 2). П’s claim that municipalities failed to adequately train their officers and that such failure amounted to a municipal policy.
