Civil Procedure
Prof. Bernstein
Fall 2014
Chapter Two: Personal Jurisdiction
A. The Origins: rooted in due process is about power of states AND personal rights.
1. 12(b)(2) must be raised in first response, OR pj is waived (12(h))
2. In personam: adjudication is about a person’s rights and obligations
3. In rem: adjudication is about the status of some property.
4. Quasi in rem (involves “attaching” property, by putting it in the well of the court)
a. Quasi in rem I: Dispute involves the rights of the parties in the property itself. Jurisdiction is based upon the presence of the property in the state is ok.
b. Quasi in rem II: Dispute is unrelated to the ownership of property jurisdiction cannot be based solely on the presence of the property in the forum state.
c. Pennoyer v. Neff (1877)
(1) F: Δ Neff hired lawyer Mitchell for legal but doesn’t pay. Mitchell files claim but D is not here so, constructive notice is entered in paper. D doesn’t show because he’s not there so Mitchell wins, in order to “cover legal fees.” After the judgment, Mitchell found out that Neff had purchased some land in Oregon (allegedly worth $15,000). Mitchell attaches the judgment to the property and has the sheriff seize it. Mitchell then sells it to D Pennoyer. p comes back and is like “where’s my property!?”
(2) H: The first suit was IN PERSONAM because property was attained AFTER default judgment was entered and in personam requires personal service while they are in the state in question.
B. The Modern Constitutional Formulation of Power
1. Redefining Constitutional Power
a. International Shoe (1945) (min. contacts & fair play and substantial justice)
(1) F: Washington set up unemployment tax, Int. Shoe didn’t pay in, so Washington served salesmen in state & mailed headquarters.
(2) I: International Shoe claims that they didn’t have jd, because didn’t have direct office or stocks in Washington. Their headquarters is in MO. They just had a couple of salesmen in Washington.
(3) R: Now you must have minimum contact. Minimum Contacts Test:
(a) What is the nature of D’s contacts with the state?
(b) What is the claim brought against D?
(c) Is the nature of D’s contracts w/ the state closely related to the claim brought against D?
(4) Diff from Pennoyer? Now the nature of the physical presence matters.
b. McGee (1957)(purposeful availment)
(1) F: Insurance company mailed insurance offer to decedent in CA. p bought insurance (K) from D in TX.
(2) R: Because Ds purposefully availed themselves of the laws of CA by entering into a K with a resident, there is pjd. Also CA has manifest interest.
c. Hanson (1958) (purposeful availment)
(1) F: decedent set up trust fund for daughters, K was made in PA with fund based in DE. She moved to FL and then died there.
(2) I: Does FL has pjd over the bank in DE.
(3) R: Must have been reasonably foreseeable that D would have been hauled into court there.
(4) H: Unilateral activity by p cannot establish pjd over D
d. Int. Shoe, Hanson, McGee all deal with shrinking state boundaries.
2. Absorbing In Rem Jurisdiction
a. Shaffer v. Heitner (1977) (extends Int. Shoe to property)
(1) p files in Delaware state court saying that violated duties that resulted in fines, the court sequesters their shares in Greyhound Corp. because Delaware law allows it to do so & use the stocks as legally being present in Delaware & prevents them from being sold
(2) I: Under Pennoyer this was fine because it was quasi in rem, because property was in state, the state could use it to pull in the out of state Ds.
(3) H: The ruling here is that just because you have land (or other property, like stocks) in a state is not sufficient enough to subject the property owner to a lawsuit in that state UNLESS the property is the reason for the legal issues.
(a) “We no longer assume states have an interest in everything that goes on in their state, states need to specifically show interest.”
3. Specific Jurisdiction
a. World-Wide Volkswagen: (1980)(foreseeability/purposeful availment)
(1) F: p buys car in NY, leaves for AZ, in OK ps are hit by a car and this causes a fire. Sue D1 WWV (inc. in NY, business in NY, NJ, CT) and D2 Seeway (NY) in OK.
(2) R: How to determine whether D has purposefully availed himself?
(a) Is D trying to serve the market in that state?
(b) Does D expect that good will be purchased by consumers in that state?
(3) H: Foreseeability is not a sufficient benchmark, otherwise, “every seller of chattels would appoint the chattel his agent.” Essentially would get rid of pjd. D didn’t intend to purposefully avail himself of the laws of OK, unilateral K doesn’t work
(4) Brennan Dissent: D purposefully injected the vehicle into the stream of commerce (Brennan gets his way in the next case)
b. Burger King Corp: (1985)(fair play and substantial justice)
(1) F: B
with majority that there is no jurisdiction over McIntyre; Precedents suffice to decide this case; this case does not implicate modern concerns.
(ii) Single isolated sale does not give rise to purposeful availment
(c) Justice Ginsburg (Dissenting Opinion):
(i) Manufacturer can avoid jurisdiction, except where its products are sold in sizeable quantities; Manufacturers can claim they are targeting whole market.
(ii) Targeting U.S. market is targeting all states (Purposeful Availment)
4. General Jurisdiction: when relationship is so systematic or continuous that D is subject to suit on any claim
a. General Jurisdiction IF:
(1) Individual citizenship/domicile
(2) Corporation has its PPB
(3) Corporation is incorporated in the state
(4) Individual just happens to be there (Tag Service)
b. Goodyear: Two boys from NC died in a bus accident in FR. Their parents brought a wrongful death action in NC against Goodyear USA (OH), and three of its foreign subsidiaries incorporated in Europe. The foreign subsidiaries manufactured tires primarily for sale in Europe and Asia, but a small percentage of tires was distributed in NC through other affiliates. This tire, however, was manufactured in Turkey and was never distributed in NC.
(1) No GJ over foreign subsidiaries who manufacture and sell in foreign countries, when product injures NC resident. GJ only when company is “at home.”
c. Daimler: GJ will generally be limited to the places where a corporation is incorporated and its principal place of business.
(1) F: P is suing MBUSA to get to Daimler Argentina. (Parent Company)
(2) H: Court rejects agency theory that MBUSA acted as Daimler’s agent and attributed MBUSA’s CA contacts to Daimler. (Depends on whether the subsidiary performs services sufficiently important to the foreign corporation)
(a) Rejects agency theory; analysis should be done separately (one analysis for Daimler and one for MBUSA); refusing to “pierce the corporate veil”
