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Criminal Procedure
Stetson University School of Law
Jacob, Bruce Robert

Criminal Procedure

Jacob

Spring 2015

4th Amendment

SEARCH & SEIZURE o Brown v. Texas

ƒ No 4th Am. violation when police detain ∆ for ID purposes.

ƒ Reasonableness of seizures less intrusive than traditional arrest depends on balance between public interest and individual’s right to personal security from arbitrary police interference.

o Minnesota v. Dickerson

ƒ If lawful pat-down of suspect’s clothes results in detection of an immediately recognizable object, then there is no invasion of privacy.

x Similar to justification for plain-view seizures…so long as police stay within bounds of Terry.

o Illinois v. Caballes

ƒ The Const. does not req. police to have reasonable suspicion to use a drugdetection dog on a car during a legal traffic stop.

x No invasion of privacy b/c/ drug dog merely alerted officers to illegal drugs.

o Dunaway v. New York

ƒ 4th & 5th Am.s violated when police (w/o probable cause) take ∆ into

‘custody’ and transport her to police station for interrogation.

x To determine whether police action (stop-and-frisk) was a reasonable intrusion to privacy under 4th Am.:

o Ct. must balance violation of indv. privacy against interests in crime prevention/detection + officer safety.

SEARCH WARRANTS o Michigan v. Summers

ƒ Search warrant for home carries the ltd. Authority to detain occupants of premises while proper/lawful search is conducted.

x Risk of harm to police + occupants is minimized if officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation.

o Bailey v. U.S.

ƒ Arrests incident to execution of search warrant are lawful under 4th Am. – but once individual leaves premises being searched, any detention must be justified by other means.

o Draper v. U.S.

ƒ Probable cause exists where known facts + circumstances would cause a reasonable person to believe an offense had been, or is being, committed. o Hill v. California

ƒ Chimel is not retroactive.

ƒ If police have probable cause to arrest a person (police reasonably believe that person to be the suspect) – then an arrest + search incident to arrest are valid under 4th Am. o Chimel v. California

ƒ Even if an arrest is valid, a warrantless search of arrestee’s house cannot be Const. justified as a search incident to arrest.

ƒ Officers may perform a search of arrestee’s person and “the area within immediate control” of arrestee – not an entire house. o Gerstein v. Pugh

ƒ The State must provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty.

x Must be made by a judicial officer before or promptly after arrest.

o U.S. v. Jones

ƒ Govt. attachment of GPS device to ∆’s vehicle (and use of device to track movmt.) does constitute a search/trespass under 4th Am.

x NOTE: police have same freedom to roam the road as anyone else – can follow someone around [all day] w/o amounting to a search.

o Ybarra v. Illinois

ƒ Terry req. individualized reasonable suspicion.

x Hearsay can be used in an affidavit for a search warrant.

o Maryland v. Pringl

’ 4th is violated. o Katz v. U.S.

ƒ When a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, 4th Am. kicks in to protect that privacy.

x 4th Am. is concerned with and designed to protect people – not places.

o Gates v. Illinois

ƒ Where an anonymous tip is backed up with actual police findings, a totality of the circumstances approach = appropriate method of determining PC instead of using 2-prong Spinelli test or basis of knowledge test from Katz. x 4th Am. req. no more than a finding by an issuing magistrate that there is a “substantial basis” that a search will uncover evidence of wrongdoing.

BODILY INTRUSIONS o Rochin v. California

Taking a suspect to a hospital to have stomach pumped against will to recover drugs (that police saw him swallow) shocks the conscience and was equivalent to torture = violation of 4th & 14th Am.

x Hinges on bodily intrusion.

o Schmerber v. California

ƒ The taking of a suspect’s blood (to preserve BAC lvl. Evidence) ╪ shock the conscience, no 4th or 14th Am. violation. x Not the same as pumping stomach.

o Breithaupt v. Abram

ƒ Police may draw blood from an unconscious driver after an accident – does not shock conscience.

x NOTE: differs from Schmerber b/c here, ∆ cause an accident and was found in car, not home.