Crim Law Outline
Tuesday, April 15, 2008
6:18 PM
1. M’Naghten Rule: A person is insane if at the time of the act she was laboring under such a defect of reason arising from a disease of the mind that she did not know the nature and quality of the act that she was doing, if she did know it she did not know what she was doing wrong.
a. The first creates a special mistake of fact, applying to the nature and quality of the D’s act
i. Most jurisdiction hold that the D does not know the nature and quality of his act if he did not understand the natural consequence of his actions. (Example holding a flame to a building would cause it to burn.)
OR
b. The second creates a special mistake of law defense, regarding the wrongfulness of the defendant’s act. (THIS IS THE MORE IMPORTANT WING)
i. Types of knowledge
1. Lack of intellectual knowledge of legal wrongfulness
2. Lack of intellectual knowledge of moral wrongfulness
3. Lack of emotional or affective knowledge of legal wrongfulness
4. Lack of emotional or affective knowledge of moral wrongfulness
2. Statutory Construction
a. Doctrine of strict Construction: Construing the statute in the D’s favor. Keeler
b. If the prosecution’s reading of a criminal statute might have a chilling effect on protected conduct, courts are more likely to construe the statute in the defendant’s favor.
c. If the statutory construction advocated by the prosecution is necessary to achieve a significant legislative goal, courts are less likely to construe that statute in the D’s favor.
d. Keeler: man punched pregnant wife in stomach with intent to kill fetus. In this case, the court ruled that expanding the murder statute to include fetus as a human being was unconstitutional b/c it deprived D of fair warning.
e. Sobiek: man’s conviction of embezzlement from partnership was upheld because the court ruled that the there was a common social duty which the D should have been aware of and therefore should have had warning.
3. Trespassing
a. Bouie- The state charged the demonstrators with trespass even though trespass has historically been entry with notice and not failure to leave after notice. State court was liberally construing trespass statue to find way to prosecute demonstrators. Supreme Court did not rule on the defendant’s due process claim; however, Supreme Court did reverse convictions based on a strict construction of the trespass statute. Court is indirectly supporting demonstrators without ruling on constitutional issue.
Why does court in Sobiek not use strict construction but Keeler and Bouie courts do use strict construction?
Bouie – defendants were acting morally proper (engaging in civil rights protests) and, therefore, were doing the right thing.
Sobiek – defendant’s acts of stealing his partners’ money were improper. And if court strictly construed statute and adhered to common law rule that partner cannot steal other partners’ common funds, then there was nothing else to charge Sobiek with. Common social duty gave Sobiek fair warning that his actions were wrong.
Keeler – A common social duty would have also told Keeler that his conduct was wrong. However, the court strictly construed the statute b/c of the court’s fear of a chilling effect on abortion rights if it liberally construed the statute to hold that a viable, but unborn fetus is a human being. Also, the court had plenty of other things to charge Keeler with so he would not get away free and clear.
4. Stacking Offenses: Kidnapping and Burglary
a. Faison: Faison raped 2 women; however, in addition to the rape charges the prosecution charged him with kidnapping b/c he moved the victims to different areas to conduct the rape. In the first case, he moved a secretary away from a window to rape her and in the second case he moved a lady in her house to a different room. Faison is refuting the kidnapping charges. Prosecution brings kidnapping charges b/c the Florida statute allows prosecution to charge someone with rape if he or she holds someone against his or her willand has intent to commit ANY felony.
i. -MAJORITY- The majority reads the statute more favorably to the defendant, but still affirms the convictions adopting the Bugg test.
1. Bugg Test: If a TAKING or CONFINEMENT is alleged to have been done to facilitate the commission of another crime, to be KIDNAPPING the resulting movement or confinement:
i. More than incidental
1. Faison movement was substantially violent, not inherent to the crime
ii. More than that inherent in the other felony
1. Not necessary to commit the crime
iii. Has significance independent of the other felony.
1. Abductions were to move away from the windows so no one would see, help to commit the crime easier, moved from access to the door, etc.
2. Majority found the 3rd factor to be of the most importance in Faison b/c the defendant moved the woman to different rooms where it would have been less likely for him to get caught.
-CONCURRENCE – Justice Alderman’s argues for a LITERAL interpretation of the statute – In other words, every rape or robbery is also a kidnapping according to the statute’s text.
-DISSENT- Justice Boyd’s dissent reads the statute even more favorably to the defendant, he would reverse the kidnapping convictions b/c every robbery and rape should not automatically become a kidnapping. Essentially Boyd has 2 arguments: (1) Deterrence argument and (2) Due process argument. Boyd believes that if every robber or raper is charged as a kidnapper, then all robbers and rapers will move their victims as there is no incentive not to. Secondly, Boyd believes the stacking of charges violates due process b/c it opens the door for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by prosecutors as a prosecutor will have a lot of freedom in what to charge the defendant with.
b. Stacking may foster arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement b/c t increases the number of crimes that defendants can be charged with. The prosecutor can then pick and choose which D they want to stack crimes against.
b. State v. Hamilton: The court looks to the
iii. How do we distinguish attempt from preparation?
1. Dangerous Proximity Test (C/L)
i. Under this approach the issue of the actor’s NEARNESS to completion of the offense is subsumed in a broader inquiry that also encompasses the gravity of the harm threatened, the degree of apprehension aroused, and the probability that the conduct would result in the intended offense. After evaluating all these, the court should ask whether there is a “dangerous proximity to success.”
ii. Criticized for assuming conduct based on froseeability
2. Res Ipsa Loquitor (C/L)
i. An act done with intent to commit a crime is not a criminal attempt unless it is of such a nature as to be in itself sufficient evidence of the criminal intent with which it is done. Look at the D’s actions, if you can guess what he was going to do next, then you satisfy this. (like if you are watching a movie and you pause it and the audience can guess what is going to happen next.)
ii. However, the requirement that the actor’s criminal purpose be evident on the face of the conduct precludes criminal liability based solely on confessions or other representations of purpose. Sufficient Evidence of Criminal Intent.
3. Model Penal Code
i. (MPC § 5.01) Is a combination of the two common law tests, but it waters them both down to make it easier for the prosecution to get a conviction. (1) The defendant has to take a SUBSTANTIAL STEP toward the commission of the crime that is (2) STRONGLY CORROBORATIVE of the defendant’s intent to commit the crime.
b. Smith v. State
i. Man saying “give me” and “show me” to the girl. Three judges with three different conclusions:
ii. The appellate court splits three ways on the issue
1. Judge Lawrence would have affirmed all the convictions, because Smith’s acts went beyond “mere preparation”
i. Says the actions showed a direct movement towards the act. He’s gone beyond mere preparation.
