Proximate Cause
1. Physical Harm
a. Ryan v. NY Central RR
i. Due to negligence, D’s home caught fire burning down neighboring building as well as a number of homes to incinerate.
ii. Every person is liable for the consequence of his own acts; he is thus liable in damages for the proximate results of his own acts, but not for remote damages.
1. “To hold that the owner must not only meet his own loss by fire, but that he must guaranty the security of his neighbors on both sides, and to an unlimited extent, would be to create a liability which would be the destruction of all civilized society.
b. Coincidence: Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough
i. Man was driving his car above a posted speed limit during a windstorm when a tree which was negligently be kept near the road in disputed condition blew over crushing P’s car.
ii. Speeding did not bar P from recovery because speed did not cuase or contribute to the accident (did not increase the risk of hazard of being struck)
c. Georgia Ry. V. Price
i. Train station passed P stop without giving her an opportunity to get off and placed P up in a hotel. At the hotel, a kerosene lamp caught fire to the mosquito netting surrounding P’s bed which burned her hand as she was attempting to put the fire out. Sued RR claiming it was acting as proprietor.
ii. P’s harm was too remote from the RR’s negligence which was passing her stop, and therefore was not the natural and proximate cause of her injury.
1. 2d actor’s negligence cuts off the 1st actor’s negligence where the 2d actor’s actions couldn’t have been foreseen
d. Exception to Price: Hines v. Garret (1921)- Wartime
i. RR carried 19 yr old P a mile past her stop at night, forcing her to walk the unsettle area in the dark and be raped once by a soldier and again by a hobo.
ii. Generally: no responsibility for wrong attaches whenever an independent act of a 3d person intervenes between the negligence complained of and the injury.
iii. ACCEPT: doesn’t apply where the very negligence alleged consists of exposing the injured party to the act causing the injury. . . whenever a carrier has reason to anticipate the danger of an assault upon one of its passengers, it rests under the duty of protecting such passengers against the same.
e. Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co.
i. 14 yr old boy fell from a bridge and hit high-voltage wires as he fell. D was not responsible for boy’s fall, but was responsibl
entral & H.R.R.
i. Driver had a collision with the RR Company causing the horse to die, the wagon to be spilled, and the contents to be stolen. The question to the ct is whether P has a right to recovery of the value of the barrels, cider, and blanket stolen by the thieves.
ii. Negligence on behalf of D caused the condition which placed the driver in a manner that he was no longer able to protect his employer’s property.
1. “The act of the 3d person intervening and contributing a condition necessary to the injurious effect of the original negligence will no excuse the first wrong doer, if such an act could have been foreseen.”
i. Watson v. Kentucky & IN Bridge RR (irreconcilable w/ Price & Horton)
i. Tank car containing gasoline derailed causing a leak. Duerr, who had recently been discharged by D, flicked a match igniting the flame starting a large fire.
If Duerr acted maliciously, D could not have foreseen this malicious wanton bx, could not have anticipated it, and could not be held primarily negligent.
