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Torts
St. Thomas University, Florida School of Law
Corgill, Dennis S.

Tort: a civil wrong which the law provides or imposes a remedy
•   from the latin word “tortus”meaning twisted and the French word “tort” meaning injury or wrong
•   imposes duties on a person to act in a manner that will not injure other persons
•   Purpose: to provide a way for parties to adjust their rights in a peaceful manner, to deter bad behavior/wrongful conduct, to encourage socially responsible behavior, to return injured parties to original condition and provide compensation for injury
•   Three possible bases of tort liability:
•   A. Intentional conduct
•   B. Negligent conduct that creates an unreasonable risk of causing harm.
•   C. Conduct that is neither intentional nor negligent but that subjects the actor to strict liability because of public policy.
 
Restatement of Torts 2D:
§4. Duty- actor is required to conduct himself in a particular manner at the risk if he does not do so he becomes subject to liability to another whom the duty is owed for any injury sustained by such other, of which the actor’s conduct is legal cause
 
§6. Injury and Harm – (1) Injury is used to denote the invasion of any legally protected interest of another. (2) Harm is used to denote the existence of loss or detriment in fact of any kind to a person resulting from any cause.
 
§8A. Intent – the actor desires to cause or believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.
 
§9. Legal Cause – the fact that the causal consequence by which the actor’s tortious conduct has resulted in an invasion of some legally protected interest of another is such that the law holds the actor responsible for such harm unless there is some defense to liability.
 
§10. Privilege – to denote the fact that conduct, under ordinary circumstances, would subject the actor to liability, under particular circumstances does not subject him to such liability.
 
§10A. Consent – willingness in fact that an act or invasion of an interest shall take place.
 
§12. Reason to Know, Should Know – (1) “Reason to know” to denote the fact that the actor has information from which a person of reasonable intelligence or of the superior intelligence of the actor would infer that the fact in question exists, or that such person would govern his conduct upon the assumption that such facts exists. (2) “Should know” to denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence or of the superior intelligence of the actor would ascertain the fact in question in the performance of his duty to another, or would govern his conduct upon the assumption that such fact exists.
 
 
 
 
•   Development of Liability Based Upon Fault.
•   Anonymous (1466)
•   The judge observed that an individual must go about his/her business in such a way that “by his deed no injury or damage is inflicted upon others.” Accordingly, if an individual is building a home, and a piece of wood falls on the individual’s neighbor’s home, the neighbor has a cause of action, even though the house was lawfully being built and the builder did not intend for the damage to occur. Additionally, if somebody defends themselves when another party assaults them, and in the course of this defense a third party is injured, that third party would have a cause of action, even though the injury was not intentional and was while defending oneself.
•   This case offers a very early description of a duty and a breach of duty.
 
•   Weaver v. Ward (1616)
•   Rule – One may escape liability for an injury he has inflicted when he was utterly faultless in inflicting the injury, but it is his burden to prove his total lack of fault.
•   Holding – Court found for the injured party. Accident doesn’t mean not liable.
 
•   Brown v. Kendall (1850)
•   Rule – When a defendant unintentionally injures another while undertaking a lawful act, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted without due care as adapted to the exigencies of the circumstances.
•   Holding – The act of separating the dogs was a lawful act and the plaintiff exhibited due care.
•   This decision by is the earliest clear statement of the rule commonly applied: Liability must be based on legal fault.
•   After Brown v. Kendall:
•   Plaintiff must prove:
•   defendant had a duty
•   defendant breached duty
•   plaintiff breached no duty
 
•   Cohen v. Petty (1933)
•   Rule – One who is stricken by illness and had no prior knowledge of the illness while driving a car cannot be charged with negligence.
 
•   Spano v. Pernini Corp. (1969)
•   Rule – In the case of blasting operations, failure to prove negligence will not bar recovery when damage to an innocent party results from the blasting. Because blasting is an abnormally dangerous activity, public policy requires that the costs of the damage resulting to innocent parties be borne by those undertaking the blasting, even when they have not behaved negligently.
•   Holding- Found for building owner.
•   Strict Liability – §519. One who carries on ultra hazardous activities is subject to liability for harm to the person, land, or property of another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.
 
•   Intentional Interference with Person or Property.
•   Intent 
•   §8A. actor desires to cause consequences of his act or believes with substantial certainty that consequences will result from it
•   volitional act – if act is committed consciously, it is volitional
•   Before there is an intentional tort, there must be intent.
•   3 different types of intent:
•   1. General Intent – desires to cause harmful or offensive contact
•   2. Specific Intent – believes that a harmful or offensive contact is substantially certain to result
•   3. Transfered intent – an act committed on one person, but instead committed on an other. It can also occur when a person intends to commit a specific tort on a person, but instead commits a different tort.
•   – only may be invoked where the tort intended and the tort that resulted are: assault, battery, false imprisonment, trespass to land, trespass to chattels.
 
•   Garratt v. Dailey (1955)
•   Rule – The relevant intent for the purposes of assault and battery may be found from evidence establishing that defendant knew to a substantial certainty that contact or apprehension of contact would result from his actions (general intent). A defendant’s age in such a case is relevant only insofar as it demonstrates defendant’s likely degree of knowledge based upon his experience and understanding.
 
•   Spivey v. Battaglia (1972)
•   Rule – A defendant becomes liable for reasonably foreseeable consequences, though the exact results and damages were not contemplated.
•   With respect to assault and battery, one is deemed to intend that which is substantially certain to follow from his actions but need not intend to cause actual injury or harm. Knowledge of a risk of harm is not sufficient to establish the requisite intent.
 
•   Ranson v. Kittner (1889)
•   Rule – Good faith and mistake does not negate intent.
•   Holding – Does not matter that defendant shot dog instead of wolf, still had intent to trespass among a chattel.
 
•   McGuire v. Almy (1937)
•   Rule – Where an insane person by his act does intentional damage to the person or property of another he is liable for that damage in the same circumstances in which a normal person would be liable. The insane person, to be liable, must have been capable of entertaining that same intent and must have entertained it.
 
•   Talmage v. Smith (1894)
•   Rule – Transferred intent – When the defendant intends any of these five torts – assault, battery, false imprisonment, trespass to land, trespass to chattels – any accomplishes any one of the five, the doctrine applies and the defendant is liable, even if the plaintiff was not the intended target.
•   Holding – Though the defendant did not intend to hit the plaintiff, he still meant to hit somebody. The fact the injury resulted to another than was intended does not relieve the defendant from responsibility.
 
•   Battery (NO DAMAGES/INJURIES REQUIRED)
•   An act intending to cause, directly or indirectly, a harmful or offensive conduct.
•   §13 Battery:  
•   An actor is subject to liability f

contact upon the other or to have put the other in apprehension of such contact. (2) If an act is done with the intention of affecting a third person in the manner stated in Subsection 1, but puts another in apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact, the actor is subject to liability to such other as fully as though he intended so to affect him.
•   §33 Ability to Carry Out Threat: To make the actor liable for an assault, it is not necessary that he have or that he believe that he has the ability to inflict the harmful or bodily contact which his act apparently threatens.
 
•   I de S et ux. v. W de S (1348)
•   Rule – Physical contact is not a necessary element of an action for assault.
 
•   Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hill (1933)
•   Rule – For assault to occur, there must be an intentional and unlawful offer or attempt to touch another’s person in a harmful or offensive manner such that it creates a well-founded apprehension of imminent contact. It is not necessary that the defendant have the actual ability to carry our the threatened contact.
•   To constitute an actionable assault, there must be an intentional, unlawful, offer to touch the person of another in a rude or angry manner under such circumstances as to create in the mind of the party alleging the assault a well-founded fear of an imminent battery, coupled with the apparent present ability to effectuate the attempt, if not prevented.
 
•   False Imprisonment
•   An act intending to confine another, or a third person, within boundaries fixed by the actor and directly or indirectly results in such confinement of the other. The other is conscious of the confinement or harmed by it.
•   §35 False Imprisonment:
•   (1) An actor is subject to liability to another for false imprisonment if (a) he acts intending to confine the other or a third person within boundaries fixed by the actor, and (b) his act directly or indirectly results in such a confinement of the other, and (c) the other is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it.
•   (2) An act which is not done with the intention stated in Subsection (1a) does not make the actor liable to the other for a merely transitory or otherwise harmless confinement, although the act involves an unreasonable risk of imposing it and therefore would be negligent or reckless if the risk threatened bodily harm.
•   §36 What Constitutes Confinement: (1) To make the actor liable for false imprisonment, the other’s confinement within the boundaries fixed by the actor must be complete. (2) The confinement is complete although there is a reasonable means of escape, unless the other knows of it. (3) The actor does not become liable for false imprisonment by intentionally preventing another from going in a particular direction in which he has a right or privilege to go.
•   §38 Confinement by Physical Barriers: The confinement may be by actual or apparent physical barriers.
•   §39 Confinement by Physical Force: The confinement may be by overpowering physical force, or by submission to physical force.
•   §40 Confinement by Threats of Physical Force: The confinement may be by submission to a threat to apply physical force to the other’s person immediately upon the other’s going or attempting to go beyond the area in which the actor intends to confine him.