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Criminal Procedure
St. Thomas University, Florida School of Law
Lawson, Tamara F.

Mig’s Crim Pro Outline
 
Chapter 1: The Threshold of the Fourth Amendment Right
to be Secure against Searches
 
The Fourth Amendment
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
 
Katz v. United States (phone booth wiretap)
389 US 347
The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
 
Rule for privacy
The person has to show an expectation of privacy and
That expectation of privacy must be one that society would deem reasonable
 
United States v. White (undercover informant)
401 US 745
However strongly a defendant may trust an apparent colleague, his expectations in this respect are not protected by U.S. Const. amend. IV when it turns out that the colleague is a government agent regularly communicating with the authorities.
 
If the conduct and revelations of an agent operating without electronic equipment do not invade the defendant’s constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy, neither does a simultaneous recording of the same conversations made by the agent or by others from transmissions received from the agent to whom the defendant is talking and whose trustworthiness the defendant necessarily risks
 
In Katz there was a search. A talked to B in confidence and the Police eavesdropped
In White there was no search, A and B talked but b voluntarily gave up his end of the conversation
 
Smith v. Maryland (pen register)
442 US 735
A person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties. 
 
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.
 
A pen registry is not a search and the information given(the number) is voluntarily given to the phone company therefore there is no expectation of privacy and no 4th amendment violation
 
California v. Ciraolo (10 ft. fence around his “pot” garden)
476 US 207
At common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life. The protection afforded the curtilage is essentially a protection of families and personal privacy in an area intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy expectations are most heightened. 
 
That the area is within the curtilage does not itself bar all police observation. U.S. Const. amend. IV protection of the home has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares. Nor does the mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his activities preclude an officer’s observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders the activities clearly visible. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of U.S. Const. amend. IV protection.
 
A man’s home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the “plain view” of outsiders are not “protected” because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the other hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.
 
U.S. Const. amend. IV does not require the police traveling in the public airways to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye.
 
Open Fields Doctrine from Oliver v. US (pot field a mile away with no trespassing sign around it)
The special protection accorded by the U.S Const. amend. IV to the people in their persons, houses, papers, and effects is not extended to the open fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common law. Nor are the open fields “effects” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
 
The open fields doctrine is consistent with respect for “reasonable expectations of privacy.” The common law has distinguished “open fields” from the “curtilage,” the land immediately surrounding and associated with the home. The distinction implies that only the curtilage, not the neighboring open fields, warrants the Fourth Amendment protections that attach to the home. At common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life and therefore has been considered part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. Thus, courts have extended Fourth Amendment protection to the curtilage; and they have defined the curtilage, as did the common law, by reference to the factors that determine whether an individual reasonably may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain private. Conversely, the common law implies that no expectation of privacy legitimately attaches to open fields.
 
Four factor test for Curtilage from US v. Dunn (Meth chemicals hidden in barn)
The areas proximity to the home
The existence of an enclosure surrounding the area
The nature of the use to which the area is put
Precautions taken to exclude others from the area
 
§         Curtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference to four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. It is not the case that combining these factors produces a finely tuned formula that, when mechanically applied, yields a correct answer to all extent-of-curtilage questions. Rather, these factors are useful analytical tools only to the degree that, in any given case, they bear upon the centrally relevant consideration, whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home’s umbrella of Fourth Amendment protection. 
 
US v. Knotts (beeper on the drum container)
§         One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view. A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another. 
 
Bond v. US (drugs in gym bag on a bus)
529 US 334
§         U.S. Const. amend. IV provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. A traveler’s personal luggage is clearly an “effect” protected by the Amendment. 
§         Physically invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection. 
 
In this case, the officer squeezed the bag to check it. Dissent brings up a good point about expectations of privacy on a bus (touching others bags in luggage compartments)
 
Kyllo v. US (thermal heat scan of house)
533 US 27
When the police obtain by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, that constitutes a search, at least where the technology in question is not in general public use. This assures preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. 
 
The Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home has never been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information obtained. Any physical invasion of the structure of the home, by even a fraction of an inch, is too much and there is certainly no exception to the warrant requirement for the officer who barely cracks open the front door and sees nothing but the non-intimate rug on the vestibule floor. In the home, judicial precedent shows, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes. 
 
US v. Place (Airport dog sniff)
A dog sniff that only discloses the presence or absence of narcotics does not constitute a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment
 
US v. Jacobson (drugs shipped by Fed Ex)
The text of the Fourth Amendment protects two types of expectations, one involving “searches,” the other “seizures.” A “search” occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. A “seizure” of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property. This protection proscribes only governmental action; it is wholly inapplicable to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental official. 
 
Whether invasions of privacy by a private freight carrier are accidental or deliberate, and whether they are reasonable or unreasonable, they do not violate the Fourth Amendment because of their private character. 
 
When an individual reveals private information to another, he assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal that information to the authorities, and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of that information.
 
Protecting the risk of misdescription hardly enhances any legitimate privacy interest, and is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. A defendant has no privacy interest in the contents of a package where it remains unsealed and where a private freight carrier has just examined the package and has, of its own accord, invited a federal agent to its offices for the express purpose of viewing the contents. Consequently, the agent’s viewing of what a private party freely makes available for his inspection does not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 
California v. Greenwood (trash cans)
§         The warrantless search and seizure of garbage bags left at the curb outside a house violates U.S. Const. amend. IV only if the respondents manifest a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage that society accepts as objectively reasonable.
 
§         It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public. Those who have deposited garbage in an area particularly suited for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take it, could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in any inculpatory items that they discarded.
 
§     

he constitutional imperative that it not be “unreasonable” under the circumstances. As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. 
 
The motivation of the officer is irrelevant, as long as there is probable cause and his actions are considered reasonable then there is no violation.
Any traffic violation would give the police probable cause, also drugs were in “plain view”
 
Dennis v. State (guy tried to walk away from a cop when pulled over)
To justify detaining a passenger in a vehicle whose driver has been stopped by police for a traffic violation, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the passenger engaged in criminal behavior and must have intended to conduct further investigation based on that suspicion.
 
Chapter 3: Unreasonableness and the Warrant Requirement
 
A. The Warrant Requirement and Searches of Persons, Houses, Papers, and Effects
 
Johnson v. US (lady smoking opium in a hotel)
333 US 10
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. 
 
There are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be contended that a magistrate’s warrant for search may be dispensed with. The inconvenience to officers and some slight delay necessary to prepare papers and present the evidence to a magistrate certainly are not enough to by-pass the constitutional warrant requirement. 
 
An arrest without warrant is valid only if for a crime committed in the presence of the arresting officer or for a felony of which he had reasonable cause to believe defendant guilty. 
 
The government cannot justify an arrest by a search and at the same time justify the search by the arrest. An officer gaining access to private living quarters under color of his office and of the law which he personifies must have some valid basis in law for the intrusion. 
Searches without warrants are per se unreasonable.
 
B. The Warrant Requirement and Seizures of Persons
 
US v. Watson (mail worker had stolen credit cards in his car)
423 US 411
§         A police officer may arrest without warrant one believed by the officer upon reasonable cause to have been guilty of a felony. 
 
§         The rule of the common law, that a peace officer or a private citizen may arrest a felon without a warrant, has been generally held by the courts of the several states to be in force in cases of felony punishable by the civil tribunals
 
In this case, they said that in the common law rule, officers are allowed to make warrantless arrests if a felony or misdemeanor was committed in their presence as well as a felony not committed in their presence with reasonable grounds for that arrest.
 
For a warrantless arrest you need
Probable cause
A felony or misdemeanor committed in the presence or a felony outside of the presence of the officer
And it is in public
Barring any exigent circumstances
 
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (Arrest for not wearing seat belt)
532 US 318
The standard of probable cause applies to all arrests, without the need to “balance” the interests and circumstances involved in particular situations. If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender. 
 
C. The Issuance, Content, and Execution of Warrants
 
Any unreasonable violation, violates the fourth amendment.
If the police fail to “knock and announce”
If the police went beyond the scope of the warrant, etcetera
 
In getting a warrant, the police need to place every bit of information that they have for probable cause in the affidavit presented to the magistrate
 
Anderson v. Maryland (Real estate business records and General warrants case)
427 US 463
There is no special sanctity in papers, as distinguished from other forms of property, to render them immune from search and seizure, if only they fall within the scope of the principles of the cases in which other property may be seized, and if they be adequately described in the affidavit and warrant. 
 
General warrants are prohibited