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Criminal Procedure
St. Thomas University, Florida School of Law
Clark, J. Steven

PART I – SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
 
Chapter 1 – The Threshold of the Fourth Amendment Right to be Secure Against Searches
·         Katz v. United States
·         United States v. White
·         Smith v. Maryland
·         Oliver v. United States
·         California v. Ciraolo
·         Bond v. United States
 
Chapter 2 – Unreasonableness and the Probable Cause Requirement
·         Spinelli v. United States
·         Illinois v. Gates
·         Whren v. United States
 
Chapter 3 – Unreasonableness and the Warrant Requirement
The Warrant Requirement and Searches…
·         Johnson v. United States
The Warrant Requirement and Seizures of Persons
·         United States v. Watson
The Issuance , Content, and Execution of Warrants
·         Andresen v. Maryland
·         Maryland v. Garrison
·         Wilson v. Arkansas
 
Chapter 4 – Reasonable Searches w/out Warrants: The Nature and Scope of the Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
Searches and Incident to Arrest and Searches for Arrestees
·         Chimel v. California
·         United States v. Robinson
·         New York v. Belton
·         Payton v. New York
·         Steagald v. United States
Exigent Circumstances Searches
·         Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden
·         Vale v. Louisiana
Vehicle and Container Searches
·         Chambers v. Maroney
·         Coolidge v. New Hampshire
·         Texas v. White
·         California v. Carney
·         United States v. Chadwick
·         California v. Acevedo
·         Wyoming v. Houghton
Inventory Searches
·         South Dakota v. Opperman
·         Illinois v. Laffayette
·         Colorado v. Bertine
Consent Searches
·         Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
·         Ohio v. Robinette
·         United States v. Matlock
·         Illinois v. Rodriguez
The “Plain View” Doctrine
·         Horton v. California
·         Arizona v. Hicks
 
Chapter 5 – The Balancing Approaching to Fourth Amendment Reasonableness
Stops, Frisks, and the Right to be Secure in One’s Person, House, and Effects
The Constitutional Doctrine and Its Theoretical Underpinnings
o       Terry v. State of Ohio
o       Dunaway v. New York
“Seizures” of Person
o       United States v. Mendenhall
o       Florida v. Bostick
o       California v. Hodari D.
The showing Needed to “Stop” and “Frisk”
o       Illinois v. Wardlow
o       Alabama v. White
o       Florida v. J.L.
The Permissible Scope of “Stops, Frisks, and Sweeps”
·         Hayes v. Florida
·         United States v. Sharpe
·         United States v. Place
·         Michigan v. Long
·         Minnesota v. Dickerson
·         Maryland v. Buie
Balancing in other Contexts
·         Ybarra v. Illinois
·         New Jersey v. T.L.O.
·         Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz
·         City of Indianapolis v. Edmond
·         Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association
·         Chandler v. Miller
Higher Than Usual Standards of Reasonableness
·         Tennessee v. Garner
·         Schmerber v. State of California
·         Winston v. Lee
 
PART III – CONFESSIONS
 
Chapter 7 – Due Process of Law and Confessions
·         Ashcraft v. Tennessee
·         Spano v. New York
·         Colorado v. Connelly
 
Chapter 8 – The Privilege against Self-Incrimination and Confessions
The Constitutional Basis
·         Miranda v. Arizona
·         New York v. Quarles
·         Dickerson v. United States
Custody
·         Berkemer v. McCarty
Interrogation
·         Rhode Island v. Innis
·         Illinois v. Perkins
Waiver
·         North Carolina v. Butler
·         Colorado v. Spring
Invocation of Protections
·         Michigan v. Mosley
·         Edwards v. Arizona
·         Davis v. United States
·         Minnick v. Mississippi
 
Chapter 9 – The Right to Assistance of Counsel at Trial
·         Betts v. Brady
·         Gideon v. Wainwright
·         Scott v. Illinois
 
Chapter 10 – Confessions
·         Massiah v. United States
·         Brewer v. Williams
·         United States v. Henry
·         Kuhlmann v. Wilson
 
PART IV – IDENTIFICATIONS
 
Chapter 11 – Indentifications and the Right to Assistance of Counsel
·         United States v. Wade
·         Kirby v. Illinois
·         United States v. Ash
 
Chapter 12 – The Due Process Clause and Indetifications
·         Stovall v. Denno
·         Manson v. Brathwaite
 
PART V – EXCLUSIONARY RULES
 
Chapter 13 – Sources of and Rationales for the Exclusionary Rules
·         Weeks v. United States
·         Mapp v. Ohio
 
 
Chapter 14 – The Scope of and Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rules
The “Standing” Limitation
·         Note on Alderman v. United States
·         Rakas v. Illinois
·         Minnesota v. Carter
The “Independent Sources” and “Inevitable Discovery” Doctrines
·         Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States
·         Murray v. United States
·         Nix v. Williams
The “Attenuation” Doctrine
·         Wong Sun v. United States
·         Brown v. Illinois
·         Oregon v. Elstad
The “Good Faith” Exception
·         United States v. Leon
·         Massachusetts v. Sheppard
The “Impeachment” Limitation
·         Harris v. New York
·         United States v. Havens
·         James v.Illinois
 
CHAPTER 1 – Threshold of the Fourth Amendment
 
Case: Katz v United States (1967)
 
Petitioner: Mr. Katz. Katz was charged with transporting illegal gambling information to other states through the telephone. The FBI agents wired a public telephone booth, which Katz used and through this, they obtained evidence against Katz. No actual trespassing of the telephone booth took place during the phone tapping.
Respondent: U.S. Government
 
Issue: Did the wiring of the phone booth violate defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights? – Yes (overturned Olmstead v. U.S.)
Key Facts: In Olmstead v. U.S., the court had decided that Fourth Amendment applies only to tangible evidence.
Legal Reasoning: Unlike Olmstead, the court in the current case decided that the Fourth Amendment protects “people not places.” The court came up with a two prong Katz test to determine whether the defendant had the right to Fourth Amendment protection in the telephone booth. This test requires the defendant to show
 1. Whether he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the place where the search took place, and
2. Whether the society is ready to accept this expectation as reasonable.
The court decided that Katz had reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone booth and his words were protected by the Fourth Amendment. The officers clearly did not have any exigent circumstances and they should have gained a warrant before intercepting the phone messages of the defendant.
Class Notes:
 
4th amendment Evolution 1886-Katz
 
Physical Intrusion ( depended on if there was protrusion) “did something go through the wall
 
Olmstead v US (1928) – Wiretapping from outside a building did not constitute a search b/c there was no “ actual physical intrusion” or trespass upon the location.
Boyd v Us (1886) – Ordered to produce business invoices. Order was determined to be a search b/c invoices constituted forcing from a party evidence against him.
Goldman v US (1942)- government did not trigger 4th amendment coverage by placing a “detectaphone” against a building and listening to conversations.
Silverman v Us (1961) – Was a fourth amendment violation inserting a “spike mike” The physical Intrusion was deemed sufficient to cross constitutional threshold.
Clinton v Virginia (1964) – Fourth Amendment violation because there was a thumb size penetration.
 
False Friend Cases
 
Lee v Us (1952)- Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment did not govern the situation b/c the speakers consent to the presence of informant precluded trespass and he was speaking to someone he trusted and was overheard.
Lopez v US (1963) – Court declared that the recording of a bribes offer was outside the borders of fourth amendment b/c suspect had consented to agent’s presence.
Hoffa v Us (1966) – no search b/c “no interest legitimately protected by the fourth amendment was involved.” Hoffa had not relied “upon the security of his hotel room and had misplaced his confidence and allowed informant to enter.
 
Katz overruled above cases of Olmstead etc. and brought in an analysis of privacy.
 
HARLAN’s Concurring opinion “ 2 step test “
 
1. Whether he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the place where the search took place, and
2. Whether the society is ready to accept this expectation as reasonable.
BLACK’S DISSENT: Fourth Amendment does not apply to eavesdropping and if the constitution meant for eavesdropping than it would have been included. It was not included and is not to be interpreted by the language of the constitution.
Case: United States v. White (1971)
 
Synopsis: The D claims that his Fourth Amendments rights were violated when conversations between himself and an acquaintance, unbeknownst to D a government informant, were electronically transmitted to agents and at other times directly overheard by agents concealed within the informant.
Facts: Federal narcotics agents electronically overheard several conversations between a government informer, who was carrying a concealed radio transmitter, and White (D). The conversations took place in different places. Several of the conversations that took place in the informer’s home were overheard electronically by an agent outside of the home, and by another agent concealed in the informer’s kitchen closet with the informer’s consent. At no time did the agents obtain a warrant or court order. The informer was not produced at trial, and the trial court heard testimony from the agents who overheard the conversations in question.
Issue: Does the electronic recording or transmission of conversations, without a warrant, constitute an unlawful search and seizure under the 4th Amendment?
Holding: Third-party electronic monitoring, conducted without a warrant or court order, does not violate the 4th Amendment.
Reasoning: (White, J.) Third-party electronic monitoring, conducted without a warrant or court order, does not violate the 4th Amendment. The 4th Amendment offers no protection to a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that one to whom he voluntarily confides will not reveal his words. An undercover police agent may write down his conversations with a defendant, and later testify concerning his recollection of such conversations without first obtain

d should be classified as cartilage.
Case Name: California v Ciraola (1986)
 
Facts: Ciraolo; the defendant was growing marijuana in his backyard which was surrounded by a six feet and a ten feet wall. The officer received a tip and he observed the backyard of the defendant from an airplane flying at the height of 1000 feet. The officer also took pictures with a regular camera and these pictures were represented in the affidavit, which was used to obtain the warrant. The court of appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction by arguing that the defendant had objective expectation of privacy in his backyard and it was part of his curtilage. The court ruled that the air surveillance violated the defendant’s 4th Amendment rights. Now the state appeals.
Issue:1. Did the defendant have subjective expectation of privacy? 2. Is this expectation reasonable? (Katz Test)
Holding:1. Yes 2. No
Rationale: The court ruled that even though the defendant had the high fences around his backyard, the people flying over his backyard or the police officers standing on a truck could still have seen the marijuana plants in the defendant’s backyard. The court ruled that when something is visible to the public, even if it is located on the defendant’s curtilage, the defendant can not have reasonable expectation of privacy in protecting this item. Ruling of the court of appeals was reversed.
“The Fourth Amendment simply does not require the police traveling in the public airways at this altitude a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye.”
 
Dissent (Powell): “Therefore contrary to the Courts suggestion, people do not “knowingly expose” their residential yards “To the public” merely by failing to build barriers that prevent aerial surveillance.” – Court fails to enforce warrantless searches into the home are unreasonable.
 
Notes:
 
Rule: Most aerial over flights are not a search interpreted within the Fourth Amendment.
 
Class Notes:
 
Ciraola has cartilage but still court says is unprotected because visible by naked eye although by airplane.
The court seems to be bringing back the ruling that if there is no invasion or touch it is not a search, this is not mentioned in the discussion but is inferred
Oliver said trespass is not a valid defense to fourth amendment
If there is a way the public can get some kind of visual access; then there is no reasonable expectation of privacy.
 
 
NAME- Bond v. US, 2000
 
RULE- Even where personal items may be in the public domain, and can be expected to be touched or handled by others, the degree/extent to which that handling may be expected to occur is the limit of invasion allowable by government inspection without a warrant, especially when such invasion is of a physical and tactile manner.
SYNOPSIS- Border Patrol agent boards bus and checks Immigration status of passengers. On his way back to the front of the bus he “squeezes” the carry-on bags of all the passengers. Upon feeling a “brick-like” item in Respondent’s bag he searches the bag and finds a brick of meth.
 
FACTS- At a routine border check stop in Sierra Blanca, TX, border agent Cantu checks the immigration status of all passengers. On his way back through to the front of the bus he performs physical “squeeze” checks on the personal carry-on bags left in the over head compartments. Upon reaching Rs bag and squeezing, Cantu notices a brick-like item in the bag.
 
R agreed to allow a further inspection of the bag. This revealed a brick of Methamphetamine. R was arrested.
 
ISSUE- Was the carry on bag in the overhead compartment protected from Cantus squeeze search even though it was in a public area where R could have expected other passengers or bus personnel to handle it?
 
HOLDING- YES, the 4th AM prohibits unreasonable government search of an “effect” of a person. Here the court makes a distinction from Ciraolo where the intrusion was merely visual, asserting that physical, tactile inspection amounted to a far more intrusive invasion of Rs privacy and personal, protected property.
 
Especially in the case of a carry on bag, which can be readily assumed to harbor items which R would have wanted to keep close at hand, should 4th AM protection apply.