Unions and Their Members
I. Anti-Trust Laws
a. Sherman Anti-Trust Act (1890)
i. Purported to outlaw certain types of conduct (chiefly monopolization and restraints of trade) that were considered harmful to the public interest.
b. Clayton Act (1914)
i. § 6: Antitrust laws should not be construed to prohibit the existence of labor organizations or to prevent labor unions from “lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof.”
ii. § 20: Barred the use of federal injunctions in disputes between an ER and EEs, or between ERs of EEs, involving the terms and conditions of employment.
1. Duplex Printing v. Deering (1921): Supreme Court upheld an injunction issued to break a secondary boycott imposed by the Machinists Union
a. Ct. held that § 6 of the Clayton Act (exempting unions from the Sherman Act) was not available to shelter the union, since it protected only the “lawful” carrying out of “legitimate” objectives. The Ct. declared that secondary interference w/ a prop. right was neither lawful nor legitimate.
b. § 20 (barring injunctions in labor disputes) “by the natural meaning of the words used” applied only to the workers involved in an actual dispute – and not to union members boycotting activities in the plants of other ERs.
c. Norris-LaGuardia Act (1932)
i. Various procedures used to prevent effective union organizing (ex. yellow-dog K’s, objectives test, etc.) resulted in passage of this Act. Norris-LaGuardia removed the power of federal courts to enjoin union activity absent fraud or violence.
ii. Led to antitrust laws rarely being asserted against union activity – and then only where collusion between labor and management is shown to have caused a restraint in interstate trade.
d. National Labor Relations Act (1935)
i. §7 Rights:
1. Freedom to form, join, or assist labor organizations;
2. Freedom to bargain collectively with the ER; AND
3. The right to engage in concerted activity for the purpose of collective bargaining or mutual aid and protection
ii. § 8 Rights: Imposes affirmative duties on ERs to deal in good faith with unions. Management was now obligated to bargain with the union designated as the exclusive representative for EEs in a given bargaining unit
iii. Limitations of NLRA:
1. Primarily concerned with the organizing phase of labor relations
2. Dealt exclusively w/ ER tactics (i.e. ULPs)
3. Left the substantive terms of employment entirely to private negotiation
e. Taft-Hartley Act (1947)
i. Sought to balance union and ER obligations
ii. Focused on Union ULPs, and provided alternatives to collective bargaining (mediation, etc.)
f. Landrum-Griffin Act (1959) (LMRDA)
i. Focused on union corruption
ii. Regulated internal union affairs (“bill of rights” for union members)
II. Labor and Antitrust Laws
a. Legitimate Union Activities Exemption
i. Allen Bradley Co. v. IBEW, Local 3 (1945): When the unions participated with a combination of business men who had complete power to eliminate all competition among themselves and to prevent all competition from others, a situation was created not included with the exemptions of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts.
ii. UMW v. Pennington (1965): The antitrust laws will apply when:
1. the Union combines w/ nonlabor groups (ERs), AND
2. such combinations result in a restraint of interstate trade or commerce
iii. Local 189 v. Jewel Tea (1965): As long as the union and the ER are bargaining over subjects as to which they were required to bargain – i.e. wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment – the activities are exempt form the antitrust laws.
iv. Connell Construction v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100 (1975): Where secondary pressure by the union results in an agreement by the contractor not to award jobs to nonunion sub-K’ors, the union may also be liable under the antitrust laws.
v. American Federation of Musicians v. Carroll (1968): Respondents, union members and professional musicians, challenged certain union practices, including those relating to the minimum prices that orchestra leaders had to charge for a club date. The Court held that the provision that set minimum prices that orchestra leaders had to charge for a club date operated to protect the wages of employees on club dates and thus was a wage, rather than a price, provision.
III. Federalism and Labor Relations
a. Preemption of State Labor Law: An Overview
i. Scope of Federal Power
1. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon (1959): The NLRA is interpreted very broadly.
a. If an activity is even arguably regulated or protected by federal law, the states have no jurisdiction to regulate that activity.
b. The preemption doctrine does not apply when the matter is of only “peripheral” concern to federal labor policy.
2. Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach EEs v. Lockridge (1971):
a. Union members were barred from bringing breach of K suits in state ct. for wrongful suspension from union membership, where the sanction imposed was discharge from employment, b/c this sanction was arguably subject of § 7 or 8 of the NLRA.
b. SC carved out an exception to the preemption doctrine to permit state regulation of conduct that “touches interests deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility.”
3. Farmer v. UBCJ Local 25 (1977):
a. A state ct. tort action by an EE against his union for IIED is not preempted by the NLRA – provided that the conduct in question is unrelated to alleged employment discrim., or particularly abusive tactics of discrim. are involved.
b. A claim of IIED arising in the context of an alleged ULP and the events surround the EEs discharge has been held preempted by fed. Law. (Viestenz)
c. If an EEs claims of IIED require interpretation of a CBA, such claims are preempted. (DeCoe)
ii. Arguably Protected Activity Violating State Law
1. Sears v. San Diego Carpenters (1978):
a. The NLRA has been held not to preempt state court jurisdiction over an ERs action to enforce state trespass laws against picketing that is both arguably protected and arguably prohibited under federal law.
iii. Preemption to insure “effective implementation of federal processes”
1. Lodge 76 IAM v. WI ERC (1976):
a. Federal labor policy preempts the authority of a state labor relations board to grant an ER covered by the NLRA an order enjoining a union and its members from continuing to refuse to work overtime, pursuant to a union policy to put economic pressure on the ER in CB negotiations.
b. Specific Applications: Representation, Bargaining and Concerted Activities
i. Selection of Bargaining Representative
1. Brown v. HERE, Local 54 (1984):
a. State law is preempted by federal labor law if the sate law interferes with the exercise of rights protected by federal labor law.
b. Congress intended to preserve some room for state action concerning the responsibilities and qualification of union officials.
c. Note: Another type of preemption is based on the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB and comes into play even when the state law at issue regulates conduct only arguably protected by federal law. This jurisdictional presumption of preemption can be overcome when unusually “deeply rooted” local interests are at stake.
ii. Collective Bargaining
1. Teamsters, Local 24 v. Oliver (1959):
a. The goal of federal
atute, even though EEs were union members covered by a CBA with grievance and arbitration procedures.
iv. State Regulation of Unionization by Supervisors
1. Marine Engineers v. Interlake Co. (1962):
a. The task of decididnig what is a “labor organization” requires the same expertise that the NLRB must bring to bear in deciding the applicability of § 7 and 8 of the Act.
b. Hence, the courts must defer to the Board whenever a reasonably arguable case can be made that a union is a “labor organization” w/in the meaning of the Act.
2. Hanna Mining v. Marine Engineers, Dist. 2 (1965):
a. Because of the statutory exclusion of supervisors, the Court concluded that “activity designed to secure organization of recognition of supervisors cannot be protected by § 7 of the Act, arguably or otherwise,” AND
b. Picketing to compel representation of supervisors is not prohibited by § 8(b).
v. Exclusive Representation and Majority Rule
1. J.I. Case v. NLRB (1944):
a. The ER may not negotiate individual K’s w/ EEs, or use the existence of K’s prior to certification as grounds for refusing to bargain w/ the union.
b. All parties, including the ER, are bound by the election and must deal w/ and through the elected representative.
c. The individual EE is a 3rd party beneficiary of the terms of the CBA, b/c she shares common benefits that she might not be able to obtain through individual negotiation w. the ER.
d. Policy: Moreover, individual ER-EE negotiations could be used to subvert the union’s bargaining position, as when “favored” EEs (or those hostile to the union) are offered better terms in return for opposition to the union.
e. Collective bargaining involved collective burdens as well as collective benefits. Thus, for the greater good of the whole, some EEs may find that their pay, as established in an individual hiring agreement, may be reduced by a CBA even though the term of the individual Ks has not run.
f. The ER and the union were always free to negotiate a bargaining agreement that set minimum terms only, leaving open the possibility of individual EEs negotiating more favorable terms.
2. Emporium Capwell v. Western Addition Community Organization (1975): (9(a) supersedes § 7 rights of individual EEs)
a. If a union has exclusive authority under 9(a) to represent all EEs in the unit, an EE has no independent right to bargain w/ the ER. Thus, individual EEs who engage in concerted activities w/o union approval are not protected by § 7 from discipline (including discharge).
b. If ER discipline in such cases violates Title VII, the EEs affected may seek relief under the provisions of that Act, but the ER cannot be charged w/ a ULP under 8(a)(1).
c. If a union has been recognized as the exclusive representative for EEs in a bargaining unit, the EEs must channel their grievances and activities through the union. This is true even for nonunion EE in an open shop.
3. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville RR (1944):
