LABOR LAW OUTLINE
Prof. Clancy—Fall 2006
I. Labor as a Commodity
A. The Common Law: historically, it was unlawful for workers to combine together for the purpose of raising wages even though employers together could agree to raise prices under to aegis of competition. The ends/means test was used to resolve labor disputes. Collective action was deemed a criminal conspiracy to raise wages. Even if picketing was peaceful, it would be illegal if the ultimate ends or objective of the picketing was to raise wages. If collective bargaining was the means to raising wages, this was also illegal. Judges could look to either the ends or the means of employee action to determine if it was illegal.
1. Coppage v. Kansas (USSC 1915): Court upheld employers’ right to create and enforce yellow dog contracts which prohibited employees from joining labor unions or forego employment if they did (not a due process violation). The purpose of such contracts was to scare employees from joining unions and to give employers a legal device to thwart union power it otherwise would not be able to control. J. Pitney held that the government should not interfere with business decisions (laissez-faire) and that not allowing yellow dogs would deprive employers right to contract. Note: the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 finally outlawed yellow dog contracts and the Court did not overrule this federal statute.
Note: the dicta of this case said that unions have an inherent right to deny membership to whomever they want. This would become a problem because in 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act allowed for union shops which required that all employees hired must become a member of the union which represents employees of the particular employer. This meant unions could deny membership to minorities and this would subsequently prevent them from obtaining work with a particular employer.
B. Early Statutes (Sherman, Clayton, Norris-LaGuardia):
1. Sherman Anti-Trust Act:
a. Loewe v. Lawlor (USSC 1908): employer would not allow employees to organize under a union. Employees picketed peacefully and called for a widespread boycott of employer’s products in all cities where sold. Employer had no state law remedy to enjoin this peaceful activity. So, he sought relief under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Holding: Court held that Sherman applies because it prohibits every contract or combination designed to restrain trade. Labor unions are a form of combination, so when they organize a boycott, that is an unlawful restraint of trade. Since Sherman was a federal law, it trumped all state laws which favored unions. Note: NLRA §8(b)(4) or §8(b)(7) would now protect the union’s activity, but it was not yet enacted at the time of this case.
b. Coronado Coal v. United Mine Workers (USSC 1925): a riot ensued when coal miners tried to prevent replacement workers from taking over when the company changed hands. Originally, the Court held this was a local strike which had nothing to do with the Sherman Act. The riots were not intentionally directed towards a restraint of interstate commerce. Holding: Court eventually held that the strike an attempt to prevent non-union coal from being sold so even though it was a local strike, it violated Sherman. Note: today, these activities would be controlled by NLRA §8(b)(4) or §8(b)(7).
2. Clayton Act of 1914: Magna Charta of organized labor. §6 held that labor cannot be considered a commodity nor an article of commerce. As such, anti-trust laws cannot apply to labor unions. Negates Loewe. §20 held that federal courts cannot enjoin union activities unless there is actual harm towards the employer. Employees have the right to engage in concerted activities
if an activity falls within Norris-LaGuardia or not: 1)§13; 2)§4; 3)§7. Note: most states have adopted “little Norris-LaGuardia Acts” to deny jurisdiction to state courts to issue injunctions for labor disputes.
a. New Negro Alliance (USSC 1938): Alliance picketed and called for a boycott of a grocery store which refused to employ black workers. The employer claimed this was not labor activity and thus Norris-LaGuardia does not protect the activities of the Alliance. So, federal courts still have power to enjoin the activity. Holding: the Court looked to §13(b) of the statute which protects activities of unions and other interested parties in labor disputes. This is not limited to traditional employer/employee relationships. So, the actions of the Alliance were protected and could not be enjoined by a federal court. This holding is still good law and pickets of these sorts are still protected by Norris-LaGuardia.
b. U.S. v. Hutcheson (USSC 1941): organized labor activity was exempted from civil equitable injunctions allowed under Sherman by Clayton. This was reiterated and reaffirmed by Norris-LaGuardia. In this case, the Court held that the same holds true for criminal sanctions under Sherman as well. §20 of Clayton holds that protected activities are not to be considered illegal at all. J. Frankfurter attached §4 of Norris-LaGuardia to that provision. Labor conduct which is civilly protected is also criminally protected. So, this holding exempts all organized
