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Criminal Law
Seton Hall Unversity School of Law
Lewis, Margaret K.

Criminal Law Outline

Introduction, Theories of Punishment, and Criminal Statutes

I. Introduction
A. Nature, Sources and Limits of Criminal Law.
1. Criminal Law Defined.
a. A series of directions or commands, formulated in general terms, telling people what they must or must not do.
2. What is Unique about Criminal Law?
a. The judgment of the community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition.
b. It is the expression of the community’s hatred, fear, or contempt for the convict which alone characterizes physical hardship as punishment.
3. What is Crime?
a. Conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community.
b. MPC 1.02: Conduct that“unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests.”
c. Crimes are generally directed at preventing against harm to society.
B. Overview of Criminal Procedure.
1. Trials are the exception to the norm.
a. 90% of cases are plea-bargained.
2. Right to a criminal jury trial in all cases in which the maximum punishment exceeds six months in jail.
a. Usually has to be a unanimous finding of guilt, although majority verdicts have been upheld in some states.
C. Proof of Guilt at Trial: Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
1. A society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt. It is far worse to convict an innocent man, than let a guilty man go free.
a. This standard is impossible to quantify with precision (Ex. 95%?, 99.99%?), so it is inherently qualitative.
2. Different ways of instructing the jury on the standard.
a. Moral Certainty: A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt, but must leave the minds of the jurors in a condition in which they can not say that they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.
i. Most favorable to the prosecution.
b. Firmly Convinced: Beyond a reasonable doubt is evidence that leaves you firmly convinced of defendant’s guilt. If you think there is a real possibility that the defendant is not guilty you must give him the benefit of the doubt.
i. Most favorable to defendants.
c. No Waiver or Vacillation: Beyond a reasonable doubt means that your belief of guilt is stable and doesn’t waiver.
d. No Real Doubt: There will always be some doubt, but the law does not
require mathematical precision. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof
that you would be willing to rely and act upon without hesitation in the
most important of your own affairs.
3. Enforcing the Presumption of Innocence.
a. Owens v. State: The police found Owens asleep behind the wheel of a parked automobile on a driveway, and he was convicted of drunk driving. Owens argued that the evidence was insufficient since there was no direct evidence that Owens had been drinking while actually driving. Court stated that there were two reasonable inferences: (1) he had just arrived from the highway or (2) was just about to get on the highway. The Court was looking for a “tie-breaker” that would “tip the scales”: the defendant’s truck matched the description of a suspicious vehicle driving erratically. Rule: A conviction upon circumstantial evidence alone is not to be sustained unless the circumstances are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
i. Note: The suspicious vehicle report increased the strength of the inference that he was driving while intoxicated, and reduced the inference that he was sitting in his car drinking with the engine running. By inverse proportion, the diminishing force of one hypothesis enhances the force of its alternative.
4. On appeal (like in Owens), the appellate court gives significant deference to the trial court.
a. The standard is “whether a rational trier of fact could reasonably have reached the result that it did.”
5. Motion for directed verdict of acquittal.
a. Granted after the close of the prosecution’s case if the state has failed to overcome the presumption of innocence.
i. If a reasonable jury could only find to acquit, the judge will issue a directed verdict.
D. Jury Nullification.
1. The jury has the power to acquit for any reason whatsoever.
2. But do we want to encourage this practice?
a. State v. Ragland: D argued on appeal that the trial judge should have instructed the jury on its power to nullify. The judge instructed the jury that if it found D guilty, it “must” convict. The Court held that it does not need to instruct on the power of jury nullification. Although juries have the power to nullify, we don’t want to encourage jury nullification.
i. Policy rationale: This would lead to juries reaching arbitrary results and ultimately undermining law and order.
II. Theories of Punishment
A. Utilitarianism: Justification lies in the useful purpose that punishment serves.
1. Jeremy Bentham: All laws should augment the total happiness of the community and exclude that which subtracts from it.
a. Goal is to secure the greatest aggregate well-being: “the greatest good for the greatest number.”
b. Looking forward in time: Trying to protect society from the commission of future criminal acts.
2. Goals of the System (Kent Greenawalt).
a. General deterrence: Knowledge that serious punishment will follow crime deters people from committing crimes.
i. Objective is to deter others.
b. Individual deterrence: The actual imposition of punishment creates fear in the offender that if he repeats his act, he will be punished again.
i. On an individual basis, the punishment for the offense must outweigh the benefit to him of committing the crime.
ii. Repeat offenders are punished worse to discourage future recidivism.
c. Incapacitation: Temporarily removes convicted criminals from the general public, thus physically preventing the commission of crimes for the period of confinement.
d. Rehabilitation: Punishment may help to reform the criminal so that his wish to commit future crimes will be lessened.
i. Rehabilitation seeks to improve the defendant’s character, reintegrate him back into the community (Ex. find him a stable job), and teach him how to control his urges.
B. Retributivism: The commission of a crime is a sufficient reason for punishment.
1. Based on the principle of just deserts: Punishment should be proportionate to the crime.
2. Backward-looking: Punishment as a consequence of one’s past criminal acts.
3. Moore: The Moral Worth of Retributivism.
a. The moral desert of an offender is a sufficient reason to punish.
b. “An eye for an eye.”
c. The fact that punishment may prevent future crime is not part of the retributivist reasoning.
d. We are justified in punishing because the offenders deserve it. The moral culpability of the offender also gives society the duty to punish: A wrongdoer must be punished whether or not it prevents future crime.
4. Kant.
a. The Categorical Imperative: Human beings can never be used as a means to an end.
b. Applying this maxim to criminal justice, one should never be punished for the benefit of others (society).
c. If societal benefits occur, they should be incidental, and not the goals of punishment.
C. The Penal Theories in Action.
1. The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens: Dudley, Stephens, Brooks, and Parker are trapped on a boat in the middle of the sea without food or water. Dudley and Stephens decide to kill the boy (Parker) and eat him so that the three men can survive. The defendants were sentenced to death, but then the Queen commuted their sentence.
a. What would the ethical theories say about the result?
i. Utilitarianism: The boy was in a very weak condition and likely would have died anyway before rescue. Thus, the boy should be sacrificed for the benefit of the other three. General deterrence would not be accomplished through punishment s

bjective basis.
c. Strict construction (lenity): Any uncertainty in the meaning of a penal statute is resolved in favor of the accused.
i. Judicial interpretation of ambiguous statutes should be “biased in favor of the accused.”
ii. Statutes will be construed narrowly.
iii. Note: This doctrine does not contradict interpreting a statute in line with legislative intent since lenity only applies where the legislative intent isn’t discernible.
-Lenity is a tool of last resort.
2. The Requirement of Previously Defined Conduct (Legality).
a. Commonwealth v. Mochan: D was charged with lewd conduct not expressly prohibited by statute. Court upheld conviction since D was guilty of a common law misdemeanor (injurious to public morality).
i. Dissent (modern view): Majority created a crime out of thin air. Legislatures, not courts, have the authority to enumerate specific offenses. We can not call something a crime that was never a crime before. Rule: Courts should not create common law crimes. Nearly all states have abolished common law crimes.
b. Keeler v. Superior Court: D kneed Mrs. Keeler in the abdomen while pregnant (fetus was viable), and her baby was killed. Keeler argued that her fetus was a “human being” for purposes of the CA murder statute. Court held that an unborn but viable fetus is not a human being under CA law. It is unclear whether the legislature intended the law to apply to feticide, so under the rule of strict construction the law must be construed narrowly. D was not given clear notice by the statute that the killing of a fetus constitutes murder. Also, an expansive construction could not be applied retroactively since it would constitute an ex post facto law. Rule: Courts can not construe a statute beyond its plain intent, but can only punish for enumerated crimes.
i. Note: CA legislature amended the statute to apply to fetuses as well as human beings (note that fetus was not included under the definition of a human being, however).
ii. Ex Post Facto Clause: The Constitution forbids the government from criminalizing conduct that was innocent when done. Prohibits retroactive legislation as well as judicial expansion.
-Bouie: An “unforeseen” judicial enlargement of a criminal statute operates as an ex post facto law.
3. The Values of Statutory Clarity (Void-for-Vagueness).
a. Statutes Must be Sufficiently Definite to:
i. Give notice of the required conduct to one who would avoid its penalties.
ii. Guide the judge in applying the law and the lawyer in defending one charged with its violation.
b. In re Banks: Court considered the clarity of the “Peeping Tom Statute”: “Any person who shall peep secretly into any room occupied by a female person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” D argued law was vague and overbroad. Court disagreed since the word secretly limited the verb peep, establishing a wrongful intent requirement. Thus, the statute was sufficiently definite to provide D with adequate notice of the criminal offense, and did not prohibit conduct beyond which the legislature intended to proscribe.
i. Banks Rule I: Sufficiently definite= Does not require mathematical precision, but only reasonable certainty.