Select Page

Administrative Law
Seton Hall Unversity School of Law
Jacobi, John V.

Administrative Law Outline
Jacobi, Summer 2016
 
 
Origin, nature, and function of administrative agencies
 
Origin and Nature
Art. I, §1: All legislative powers shall be vested in Congress, consisting of Senate and House
Art II: All executive power shall be vested in President
Art III: All judiciary power shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and any inferior courts as Congress shall deem necessary
What are administrative agencies?
Administrative agencies administer government programs by exercising power delegated by congress.
Public Interest Theory – Public interest theory is based on the notion that agencies act to further the public good and are structured to maximize their ability to further public good.
Public Choice Theory – explains regulations and the structure of agencies as products of the political process in which parties with political power enlist government coercion to achieve goals that they could not achieve in a free market. Maximizing ability with political power.
Separation of powers
Separation is the concept creates separate powers in the three branches of government and establish a structure under which the branches operate.
This means that each branch of government is confined to exercising those powers within its particular sphere, and government must follow the procedures specified in the constitution.
The NonDelegation Doctrine
The nondelegation doctrine holds that congresss may not delegate its legislative power to the president, an agency, or any other entity inside or outside of government.
The nondelegation doctrine is about preventing congress from avoiding that basic restriction by delegation away so much discretionary power that someone else in effect has been granted the power to legislate.
Congress satisfies the nondelegation doctrine by supplying only “intelligible principle” to guide that discretion.
Delegation of discretionary authority to the executive branch are permissible as long as Congress made the legislative decision and the executive branch merely fills up the details.
Schechter Poultry – The court invalided a provision by the NIRA that granted the president the power to approve and make legal binding codes of fair competition where several individuals and businesses were convicted of violating a code that had been approved by the president regarding the conduct of poultry business in NY.
The court found that the set of statutory standards given to the president did not provide adequate constraints on the president’s discretion over whether to approve a particular code.
In sum, the court found that the provision gave very little guidance for the president to execute the law. In turn, the president would almost seem to be legislating it, which would violate the non-delegation doctrine.
the court decided that legislative powers can’t be delegated to private parties.
Industrial Unions (Benzene Case) – this case represented a challenge to the OSHA practice of regulating carcinogens by setting the exposure limit “at the lowest technologically feasible level that will not impair the viability of the industries regulated.” OSHA selected that standard because it believed that (1) it could not determine a safe exposure level and that (2) the authorizing statute did not require it to quantify such a level.
The Court held the Secretary applied the act inappropriately. To comply with the statute, the secretary must determine 1) that a health risk of a substance exists at a particular threshold and 2) Decide whether to issue the most protective standard, or issue a standard that weighs the costs and benefits. Here, the secretary failed to first determine that a health risk of substance existed for the chemical benzene when workers were exposed at 1 part per million.
Rehnquist’s concurrence – Rehnquist offered three rationales for the application of the non-delegation doctrine. First, ensure Congress makes social policy, not agencies; delegation should only be used when the policy is highly technical or the ground too large to be covered. Second, agencies of the delegated authority require an “intelligible principle” to exercise discretion which was lacking in this case. Third, the intelligible principle must provide judges with a measuring stick for judicial review.
The case was found to be unconstitutional because it lacked guidance. Although the secretary set the standard to the extend feasible, the court held that he should have set a standard rather than delegating it to the agency.
– The court applied the intelligible principle test to uphold the sentencing reform act, which delegated the authority to promulgate mandatory federal sentencing guidelines to the U.S sentencing commission.
The court held that the act’s declaration of purpose and goals, and its specification of the factors to be considered by the commission provided sufficient intelligible principle.
Use of intelligible principle was constitutional.
Intelligible Principle
The intelligible principle is when Congress lays down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rate is directed to conform.
The intelligible principle remains the test for determining whether congress has delegated too much legislative discretions to the executive branch.
Whitman v. American Trucking Assoc.
: EPA delegated authority under the Clean Air Act to set “national ambient air quality standards” (NAAQS).  Requires them to promulgate NAAQS, at requisite levels (with safety margin) to protect public health
: Trucking Association claims this violates the nondelegation doctrine to only give this much guidance
DC Court: EPA didn’t have a standard to pick their levels.  Any level over 0 is dangerous to some extent, and yet no one expects the EPA t

es.
Inferior officers are low-level executive official who are under the supervision of other executive officials beneath the president.
Buckley v. Valeo (1976 ) – The court ruled that the FEC could not engage in enforcement functions such as rulemaking and bringing civil lawsuits because four of its six members were appointed by members of congress, but it could continue to perform other functions such as collecting information and making reports to congress.
the court distinguished officers of the united states from government officials who do not enforce the law rather, aid in the legislative function.
Principle officers:
Must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate
Congress cannot appoint executive officers
Cannot take power away from the executive by appointing officers with executive duties
Inferior officers
Congress may allow inferior officers to be appointed by the President, Heads of Departments, or Courts of Law
People who do not exercise “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States” do not need to be hired pursuant to the Appointments Clause
National Labor Relations v. Noel Canning – Recess Appointments
Article 2, clause 3 Provides that the president shall have the power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the senate, by granting commission which shall expire at the end of the next session.
Under the recess power, president can appoint someone to serve until the senate is back.
3 question
is recess only inter-session or intra-session breaks?
The Majority agrees that the senate is in recess both in inter and intra-sessions of 10 days or more.
So if the senate takes a break for 10 days or more, then it is considered to be in recess and president can make a recess appointment.
Does the clause to all vacancies that occur during recess?
Recess appointment applies to both that exist and those that arise during recess.
This allows business of government to go on.
If recess includes intra-session breaks, should minimum time of qualifying break include or exclude pro forma sessions.
Pro Forma session is
The senate controls when it is in session.
Therefore, if someone does a pro forma session and goes home, and says that it is in session, then it is in session.