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Constitutional Law I
Santa Clara University School of Law
Steinman, Edward H.

COMMERCE CLAUSE (Art I, §8)
 
ISSUE: Does the law overstep the commerce clause?
 
p: Citizen or state (prefers this to spending clause – Lopez and Printz are nasty)    D: US
 
Law permissible if regulating: (Congress only needs to win one)
Channels – roads, waterways, airways
Instrumentalities – trucks, people, machines
(Articles – products, information)
Substantial relation to commerce
Activity is essential
Rational basis connecting law to commerce
Alternatives
 
Internal Limits (LOPEZ/MORRISON): (Congress argues you only need to satisfy 1; State argues you need all 4)
Analysis of #4: Substantial Relation to I.C.:
JX element – something in the § suggests all violations will relate to interstate
Not required BUT if there is one it suggests that there is a substantial relation to commerce
Economic issue – probably required
Crime/Education not economic – so would need jx hook
Is it commercial-Ends
Fact findings showing there is a connection to economy (Wickard – aggregate effect)
Fact Findings/ substantial effect on i.c.
Not dispositive (Morrison)
Not required, but if you don’t have 1 or 2, more fact finding is needed
Traditional state function/Historical state issue
Less likely to be upheld if concerned with education, family law or crim law)
Presumption for the state can be outweighed by showing need for national solution)
 
External Limits (PRINTZ)
Anti-commandeering (State Sovereignty)
Coercive?
Alternatives?
Plain Statement? (Court assumes violation of state rights where absent)
Ex Post Facto? (best used to limit a criminal statute)
10th Amendment (only if state is a party – no commandeering) – weak sauce
 
CHALLENGER: argue state sovereignty issues
Morrison: authority does not extend to local activity solely b/c of nation-wide aggregate effect
Lopez: non-economic, w/ no jx hook, no findings, attenuated link not w/in commerce power
Printz: Congress does not have the power to commandeer state legislature/executive branch
NY v US: fed gov’t can’t commandeer st officials to enact fed regs – accountability
Garcia: expensive for the st to implement, law is irrational, gives Congress too much leeway
 
 
DEFENDANT:
Condon: state must comply w/ valid legislation regardless of incurring costs
Garcia: broad grant of Congressional authority – states not immune to fed regulation
NLRB: activity regulated may extend to production if substantial effect on i.c.
Wickard/Raich: ok if regulate activity that has aggregate effect on i.c.
Darby: Congress may exclude from i.c. anything injurious to health, morals, welfare
Perez: Congress need not make findings
TAXING POWER (Art I, §8)
 
ISSUE: Is the tax discriminatory

d law (commandeering)
2) MEANS:
A. no knowing and unambiguous means
   a) consequences
   b) how the law works
   c) who pays?
B. not voluntary but coercive
a) facially
            b) pressures of economic reality (no reasonable alternatives)
            c) potential for economic loss
            d) regulatory
3) Means are not relevant for fed interests (ends)
            a) pretext
            b) Dole suggests means must be directly related to ends
4) can’t regulate areas that are essentially local
           
DEFENDANT:
Steward Machine: more deference owed to Congress’s assertions of general welfare
– subsidies ok when from general funds
– condition is not linked to irrevocable agreement (state has choice)
– ends sought are not unlawful
Dole: current view is that Congress may use spending power to regulate activities in areas traditionally reserved to the states (conditioned highway funds on raised drinking age limit)
1) not coercive
2) rationally related
3) unambiguous/knowing exercise of choice
4) “pressure turns on compulsion” is only dicta in Dole