Administrative Agencies & Admin Law.. 3
What is Admin Law?. 3
Warren, Admin Law in the Political System.. 3
Types of Agencies. 3
Davis & Pierce, Admin Law Treatise. 3
Warren, Admin Law in the Political System.. 3
Wilson’s Four Periods of Bureaucratic Growth. 3
Regulatory Program in the U.S. Government3
Heifetz, The Future of Admin Adjudication. 3
Agencies & Independence. 3
Separation of Powers. 4
Independent agencies. 5
Congress encroaching on Executive. 5
Congress encroaching on Judiciary. 5
The Future of Administrative Law.. 5
Freedman, Crisis & Legitimacy: The Admin Process and American Government5
Commoner, Perspective of Ecology, American Law: the 3d Century. 5
Schwartz, Lions Over the Throne: Judicial Revolution in English Admin Law.. 5
Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Admin. 5
Sargentich, Teaching Admin Law in the 21st Century. 5
Merrill, Capture Theory & the Courts. 5
Delegation of Powers. 5
Separation and Delegation. 6
Panama & Schechter cases. 6
Post-1935 Federal cases. 6
Federal Delegation: A Caveat6
Industrial Rights and Liberties. 7
Delegation and Standards – coda. 7
The U.S. Constitution & Judicial Power7
Debate on the FTC Act9
Remedies & Penalties. 9
Rules and Rulemaking. 9
Terminology and Rulemaking. 9
Warren, Admin Law in the Political System.. 10
Substantive (Legislative) Rules. 10
Other Types of Rules. 11
Substantive (Legislative) Rules. 12
Other Types of Rules. 12
Cost-Benefit Analysis. 13
Rulemaking Procedure. 14
Federal APA.. 14
Rules vs. Orders. 16
Legislative Review.. 17
Negotiated Rulemaking. 17
Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise & Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking 17
Rulemaking and the Internet17
Right to be Heard. 17
Admin Due Process Overview.. 18
Legislative v. Judicial Function. 18
Brennan, Reason, Passion and the “Progress of the Law”. 22
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing. 22
Schwartz, A Decade of Administrative Law.. 22
Friendly, Administrative Law in Britain & U.S.22
Exceptions to the Hearing Process. 22
Narrowing the Scope of the Liberty & Property Interests. 22
Postponed Hearings. 23
Emergency Cases. 23
Postponement in Emergency Situations. 23
Flexible Due Process. 24
Flexible Due Process in a school context24
Evidentiary Hearings and Decisions. 24
Parties in Interest and Intervention. 24
Notice and Pleadings. 25
From Examiners to ALJ. 26
Federal APA.. 27
Notice of Change of Title. 27
Admin Conference of the U.S., Federal ALJ Hearings. 27
Combination of Functions. 28
Admin Conference of the U.S., Proposed recommendation: Separation of Function and Staff Communications with Decisionmakers in Agency proceedings. 29
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d)29
Legal Residuum Rule. 29
Exclusiveness of Record. 29
Burden of Proof30
Exclusiveness of Record. 30
Official Notice. 30
Judicial Review.. 32
Statutory Silence. 32
Statutory Preclusion. 32
APA and Review of Discretion. 33
Primary Jurisdiction. 34
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. 35
Ripeness for Review.. 37
Scope of Review.. 37
Substantial Evidence Rule. 37
Chevron Doctrine. 38
Administrative Law Outline
Handout: B.SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 466-77 (4th Ed. 1994);
J. Dubin, Torquemada Meets Kafka, 97 COLUM.L.REV. 1289,1300-06 (1997)
Handout: GELLHORN & BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 963-71 (9th Ed. 1995)
Assignment: 1-6(n.3); 14(C)-22; 23(D)-28; 49-60 (briefs )
Assignment: 28-48 (briefs )
Administrative Agencies & Admin Law
What is Admin Law?
In the real world, procedure is substance. Is the agency following its procedures? Are courts available to prevent the agency from doing that.
Regulatory agencies: Regulate social conduct across the board.
Benefactory agencies: SSA, Veterans Administration, etc.
Organizational distinction: 1) Executive – part of the president’s cabinet; 2) Independent agencies – heads removable only by cause. Appointed for years beyond the pres’ terms. Not beholden to the president. 7 yr terms.
Gilmore v. Lujan, 947 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1991) [p.1] · Signature on BLM lease invalid because it was faxed, not an original signature.
Warren, Admin Law in the Political System
Types of Agencies
Davis & Pierce, Admin Law Treatise
Warren, Admin Law in the Political System
Wilson’s Four Periods of Bureaucratic Growth
Regulatory Program in the U.S. Government
Heifetz, The Future of Admin Adjudication
Agencies & Independence
(see discussion for 8-30-2005)
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) [p.23]
· Congress retained removal authority over the Comptroller General è he may not be entrusted with executive powers.
· Congress cannot reserve for itself removal power of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment. Otherwise, would reserve in Congress control over the execution of the laws.
Þ Officer controlled by Congress executing laws ≈ congressional veto. Threat of removal.
· Critical factor here: Removability. Pres nominates the Comptroller General from a list of 3 persons recommended by the Speaker of the House, the President the Senate, and confirmed by the Senate, he is removable only at the initiative of Congress. (26b)
Þ Supreme Court: Comptroller General’s duties weren’t just ministerial & mechanical. Plainly entails execution of the law in constitutional terms.
Ø (Interpreting a law to implement the legislative mandate) ≡ “execution” of the law.
Ø Exercises judgment concerning application of the Act to facts.
Ø Interprets the Act to determine budgetary calculations.
Þ Comptroller General’s executive nature revealed by giving him the ultimate authority to determine the budget cuts to be made. President must then carry out, without variation, the Comptroller General’s budget reductions directives. (27b)
Þ Chadha: Once Congress enacts legislation, its participation ends. Only indirect control over execution, by new legislation. Responsibility for execution of the Act are in the hands of an officer who is subject to removal only by itself. (28m)
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) [p.410]
· Challenge to the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.
· ISSUE: May Congress restrict the termination of an inferior executive official, appointed by the judiciary under a delegation from Congress, who exercises executive power?
· Whether the Act is invalid under the constitutional principle of separation of powers.
· Questions: What type of power is exercised? Examples:
Þ Executive: (Interpreting a law to implement the legislative mandate) ≡ “execution” of the law. Exercises judgment wrt facts. Interprets the Act. Having ultimate authority (i.e., President must then carry out, w/out variation, the decision).
· Sheldon v. SEC held that the agency could combine investigative adversarial (i.e., executive) and adjudicative functions (i.e., judicial) so long as no employees served in both roles.
Congress encroaching on Executive
· Separation of Powers: Congress may approve the appointment of executive officers, but may not remove except by impeachment. (Morrison)
Congress encroaching on Judiciary
· Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms held that separation of powers prevented Congress from requiring a court to reopen a final judgment.
Executive agencies, Congressional agencies, Independent agencies
Congress can’t limit the power of the executive, but may give more of its own power
Question: Are the agency’s duties essentially ministerial and mechanical. No “execution of the law” in a meaningful sense? (Bowsher)
· Supreme Court: Plainly entails execution of the law in constitutional terms. (Interpreting a law to implement the legislative mandate) ≡ “execution” of the law. Exercises judgment concerning application of the Act to facts. Interprets the Act to determine budgetary calculations. Comptroller General’s executive nature revealed by giving him the ultimate authority to determine the budget cuts to be made. President must then carry out, without variation, the Comptroller General’s budget reductions directives. (27b)
· Chadha: Once Congress enacts legislation, its participation ends. Only indirect control over execution, by new legislation. Responsibility for execution of the Act are in the hands of an officer who is subject to removal only by itself. (28m)
FTC v. American National Cellular, 810 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1987) [p.42]
· ANC arg: FTC is enforcing federal law, an executive branch function. Can only be exercised by the President or by officers appointed by the President w/ advice & consent of the Senate, serving at the President’s pleasure. FTC Commissioners are appointed by the President for 7-year terms & may not be removed by him except for cause. Allowing the FTC to engage in enforcement violates separation of powers.
· FTC was Constitutional & properly constituted and empowered by Congress. (43b) Cited Bowsher as supporting. (But Bowsher was a formalist approach.) Implicit in Bowsher: officers of the U.S., (e.g., FTC Commissioners), who are subject to Congressional removal only by impeachment, may engage federal law enforcement.