Administrative Law
I. Why agencies? Why not stick to traditional notions of law (Congress makes law, judiciary interprets, executive enforces)?
*Book hypoâMigrant worker example: no water, bathroom facilities. Causes public health issues, etc.
-Other than agencies, how do you create a system to remedy this problem?
A. Legislature could create a statuteâ
PROBLEMS:
1) Based upon politics. The farmworkers donât vote. [counterâit still effects the rest of the electorate by spreading diseases]
*Special interest politicsâto what extent do you trust legislature to properly take care of the problem?
2) Competencyâis Congress best suited to making these decisions? Does Congress have requisite expertise?
-Congress does have staffâŚbut there may be a tension between politics and expertise.
3) If the statute is incorrect, it will be difficult to correct the statute. One shotâand often, if the issue is detailed, it will require correction.
4) Efficient use of resources
5) How to monitor? Legislative Prescriptionâ
a) If private, subject to the same problems as common law
b) If public, still reactive in nature
B. Courts could regulateâmake this a tort–
PROBLEMS:
1) Jurisdictional problemsâlimited to state courts; reactive in nature
2) Expertise of courtsâjudiciary is not best equipped to deal with sweeping societal issues. Hard for judges to get the kind of information available to legislatures.
3) Private causes of actionâletting the workers sue for unsanitary conditions:
a) Problems with incentives
b) sophistication of workers
c) civil suits are reactive in nature
d) cost of suit/access to attorneys/cost of state resources
C. What are the Criteria for Evaluating competing systems?
1) Competence to set standards
a) Expertise
b) Accountability for value judgment
c) Processes for Deliberation
2) Monitoring and Enforcement
a) Incentives and resources (all kinds of problems for private parties)
b) Proof of violation and causation
3) Jurisdictional Limitsâif system, at point 1, causes problems at point 2, want system that corrects problems at all points
D. So, Create an Administrative Agency- Seidenfeld likes agencies
1) Can develop expertise
2) Accountabilityâsomewhat politically accountable (less than legislature, more than courts).
-Can the agency legitimately resort to pure value judgments? Depends on how closely constrained by politics
3) Generally flexible and proactiveâneed not define precise rules before implementing, but can adjust to problems as they occur.
4) Overcome coordination and jurisdictional problemsâcan define and implement public interest as defined by deliberative process.
PROBLEMS:
1) Potential lack of respect for legal rights
2) Interest group influence & capture (good or bad?)âS thinks agencies are less beholden to interest groups than legislature.
3) Runaway agencies and imposition of idiosyncratic values
4) Inefficiency and slothâproblem of entrenched bureaucracy.
ConclusionĂ Agency structure should:
1) Encourage, and respect, the participation of stakeholders
2) Ensure democratic accountability
3) Create incentives for agency to pursue public, rather than idiosyncratic, interests
E. What is Administrative Law?
1. In a sense, itâs procedure; in other senses, itâs more substantive (e.g. standard of review/agency accounting for itâs actionsâsubstance or procedure??)
2. Admin law is any aspect of the government that is not the legislature, president, or court (not in the whitehouse or capitol), attorney general is the head of the department of justice â job is not to just do what the president tells you rather it is to run the agency.
3. So, what is Administrative Law? Seidenfeld: the interaction of the agency with other entities/institutions. [see slide on p.2 of materials]. Interaction with:
a. President (president advises agencies & vice versa; additionally, the president appoints (& fires) some agency heads)
b. Judiciary [Article 3 courts] (all different ways)
c. Congress (one wayâCongress to agencyĂ enables agency; gives discretion; provides procedure); What kind of oversight does Congress have
d. Press (one wayâagency to press) â freedom of information act
e. Regulated entities (2 waysâagencies tell entities what to do; entities give agencies information)
f. Regulatory beneficiaries (Mostly one wayâbeneficiaries give agencies information [exceptionâregulations which only create beneficiaries, e.g. welfare])
* If an entity/beneficiary sues an agency, there are hurdles one must clear (standing, ripeness, finality, exhausted administrative remedies)âŚhowever, this is another form of agency interaction.
4. Admin. Law DOES NOT cover internal agency action (this is public administration; Exceptionâhow agency treats its internal review officers/ALJs)
F. Agency structure
1. Agency head (i.e. EPA Administrator)(âon top of the graphâ)( this is an individual or a body and makes the decisions)
2. Program Offices (i.e. Air, Water, Hazardous Waste) â defined by the substantive areas that the agency regulates
3. Enforcement (police force within agency) â this is for agencies that have responsibility for enforcing the rules â thus there
statute (Mission Statement) and agency follows appropriate procedure (procedure is the constraint).
âFor adjudication â trial type procedures and insulation from politics
âFor rulemaking â notice and comment procedures; politics a necessary factor
-PROBLEMâagencies became friendlier with the entities they regulate
4. Interest Group Model (still a common view)
â˘Role of agencies is to deliver govât benefits to competing interest groups
â˘Optimistic view (Pluralist) â access to administrative proceding; level playing field among all the interest groups; fair procedure would be important; must have transparency, which faclitates political accountability; simulates markets by facilitating delivery of goods to groups with greatest overall interest in regulatory outcome. If the value to a smaller interest is great enough, then the overall value to society outweighs the competing concern.
-Converts the bureaucratic democracy to a market (and fails, because govât is a monopolyâŚ)
â˘Pessimistic view (Public Choice) â govât generates monopoly rents by granting regulatory protections to various constituents(âIâll finance youâre campaign if you pass favorable rulesâ).
-Problemsâdifficulty in coordinating the masses results in under-representation of the masses, resulting in small focused groups winning more than they should; monopoly rents
*This view led to Ralph Nader, et al, forming interest groups to try to gain representation for the traditionally under-represented interest groups.
5. Deliberative DemocracyâWant Stakeholder Involvement (accounts for non-economically rational actions of people) (re-read âcivic republican justificationâŚ)
¡ Generat consensus on values
¡ Access to proceedings
¡ Public interest oriented justificiations for agency action
¡ To try to achieve consensus among stakeholders
â˘Process to allow empathetic interactions that can change preferences (i.e. political values)
â˘Agencies accountable to all three branches of government
â˘Agency must explain its decision in terms of factors Congress (politics?) makes relevant