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Constitutional Law I
Quinnipiac University School of Law
Dunlap, William V. 'Bill'

 
Constitutional Law Outline
Dunlap
Spring 2013
 
Chapter 3: The Commerce Power and Its Federalism-Based Limits
 
The Commerce Power
 
·         Article I, §8, cl. 3- granted Congress the power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes.”
 
·         Gibbons v. Ogden (1824)
o   Federal statute preempted the New York monopoly law under the Supremacy Clause, and Gibbons was authorized to operate his ferry in New York waters.
o   Explains why we have a fairly broad commerce power.
o   No limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution.
o   Allowed Congress to regulate interstate commerce and activities within the state affecting interstate commerce.
o   Congress may regulate any sort of commerce except that which is so local that it does not affect interstate commerce or Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce.
o   Narrow category of purely local activity not recognized by commerce clause.
 
·         United States v. E.C. Knight Co. [Sugar Trust Case] (1895)
o   Congress cannot apply otherwise legitimate anti-trust laws even though there is a massive effect on interstate commerce because the effect is indirect.
o   Congress distinguished clearly between local activities and interstate commerce.
o   Congress can regulate local activities which directly affect interstate commerce.
o   Manufacturing, by definition, is not directly related to interstate commerce.
o   Congress may not regulate purely local activities, such as manufacturing UNLESS the government can show a direct effect on commerce.
o   Congress cannot regulate activities which do not affect other states.
o   Purpose of affecting interstate commerce or the price of goods in interstate commerce.
o   Purpose to affect interstate commerce= direct effect on interstate commerce.
o   Mere existence of a manufacturing monopoly would not be a direct effect on interstate commerce.
o   The fact that an article is manufactured for export to another State does not of itself make it an article of interstate commerce, and the intent of the manufacturer does not determine the time when the article or product passes from the control of the State and belongs to commerce.
o   Congress may not regulate before a product is in commerce or after it is out of interstate commerce.
 
·         Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936)
o   Re-affirmed E.C. Knight Co.
o   Congress cannot use one power to get around another Constitutional power.
o   Producers were to comply with a national coal code in terms of the regulation of maximum hours and minimum wages in coal mines.
o   Distribution is a national interest.
o   Effect of labor provisions is a production aspect which is not commerce.
o   Production is a purely local activity which has an indirect effect on commerce and cannot be regulated by Congress.
 
·         Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935)
o   This is a purely local activity which cannot be regulated by Congress.
o   Took place entirely within the state of New York; no transactions in interstate commerce.
o   Production and distribution can be controlledà after the chicken leave, they go to stores in Brooklyn, then presumably homes in Brooklyn, so they are entirely intrastate commerce and never enter into interstate commerce.
o   Wages and hours of such employees not subject to federal control.
 
·         NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937)
o   Distinguished from Carter and E.C. Knight Co.
o   Allowed NLRB to regulate labor relations at local manufacturing plant.
o   Interstate corporation in-and-of itself.
o   In a sense company was part and parcel of interstate commerce.
o   Close and substantial relationship to interstate commerceà Congress can control.
o   If there is a catastrophic effect, that is enough.
o   Industries organize themselves so as to make their relation to interstate commerce the dominant factor in their activities.
o   End of direct vs. indirect effect test.
 
·         United States v. Darby (1941)
o   Modern Rule: Congress has the power to regulate:
§  (1)  the channels of commerce,
§  (2) for the purpose of protecting the instrumentalities of commerce.
§  (3) local activities affecting commerce.
o   The power of congress over interstate commerce extends to activities intrastate which have a substantial effect on the commerce or the exercise of the Congressional power over it.
o   Fair Labor Standards Act §15(a)(1): prohibition of shipment of the proscribed goods in interstate commerce.
§  The prohibition of the shipment interstate of goods produced under the forbidden substandard labor conditions is within the constitutional authority of Congress.
o   Fair Labor Standards Act §15(a)(2): requires employers to conform to the wage and hour provisions with respect to all employees engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce.
§  Hours and wages substantially affect interstate commerce.
o   Direct Effect is no longer the standardè new standard: “substantial effect.”
o   Rule: Congress can regulate local activities which substantially affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the Congressional power over it.
 
·         Regulates Channels of Commerce
o   Very broad interpretation of Congressional power over channels of commerce.
o   Champion v. Ames (1903)
§  Congress made it a federal offense to carry lottery tickets across state lines for the purpose of selling them.
§  Congress may prohibit the carrying of lottery tickets from on state to another.
§  Congress may use its powers to achieve whatever ends it wants to achieve.
o   Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States (1911)
§  Whether Congress can seize eggs in a local store which had already passed through commerce?
§  Congress can achieve ends not construed to it through regulation; motive is irrelevant.
o   Hoke v. United States (1913)
§  Transferring prostitutes across state lines is a federal offense which may be regulated by Congress in an attempt to stamp out prostitution.
§  Police power protects individual health and societal welfareà generally given to states, but here, it may be regulated by Congress.
 
·         Protecting Instrumentalities of Commerce     
o   Houston E.& W. T. Ry. Co. v. United States [The Shreveport Rate Case] (1914)
§  Congress can regulate rates on purely intrastate railroads because of the effect rates were having on interstate commerce; tracks ran side-by-side and crossedà influences on safety or lack of safety.
§  Federal regulatory structure Congress was using to regulate commerce is one of the instrumentalities of commerce.
§  Goods and people that move through commerce are other instrumentalities over which Congress can exercise its power to regulate.
§  Congress

ely on the line of cases relating to Wickard.
§  Difference between regulating someone who is not part of commerce because of an effect of commerce (Wickard) and forcing someone to get into commerce because of the effect that, that person staying out of commerce could have on the overall scheme.
·         In Wickard, he at least grew wheat before he was put into the market and subjected to interstate commerce.
 
·         Local Activity vs. Local Nonactivity which Affects Commerce
o   Wickard as opposed to Sebelius
o   Staying out of the system affects the legitimacy of universal coverage plan.
o   Court refuses to extend from covering local activities to covering local non-activities.
o   Third Larger Scheme: could apply to Wickard.
o   Fairly broad way of bringing things into the Lopez scheme of analysis.
 
Limits on the Commerce Power
 
·         10th Amendment: “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.
 
·         National League of Cities v. Usery (1976)
o   Fair Labor Standards Act extended minimum wage and maximum labor provisions for state and local employees.
o   Local governments are part of the state government so far as the federal government is concerned.
o   Congress may regulate wages of intrastate employees.
o   Provisions displace state’s freedoms and do not fall under Congressional authority. 
o   When Congress is trying to regulate the states in a way that interferes with state sovereignty, which impairs the states to exercise powers over their interests, Congress has gone too far.
o   States have their own level of sovereignty.
o   Regulation of states in the area of a traditional state function limits/oversteps Congressional power.
 
·         Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985)
o   San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority operates entirely in the state of Texas.
o   Overruled National League of Cities.
o   Municipal Transit Authority properly subjected to the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
o   Congress, not the courts, should address these issues.
o   Serious problem in giving power to an unelected judiciary to determine traditional government functions.
o   Designed to protect states from the federal government and from federal judges deciding the importance of state functions.
o   Political questions ought to be dealt with by Congress, not the courts.
o   Notion that there is a traditional state function that is free from Congressional interference is now gone.
o   BUT, the 10th amendment does not prevent federal gov’t from regulating the states.