I. Introduction
A. Tort law exists to provide a legal alternative to private retribution.
B. The basis for tort law is the view of a reasonable person.
II. Intentional Torts to Person or Property
A. Battery
1. Definition
a. Battery is an intentional, un-consented to contact with another that is harmful or offense.
b. A person committed a battery if they:
1) Contacted another
a. intentionally
b. and without consent
2) The contact could be construed as
a. harmful
b. or offensive
c. A tresspassory tort
2. Cases
a. Van Camp v. McAfoos (p.35 child injured woman with tricycle)
i. Intent or negligence must be present for a battery
ii. Negligence is a fault based tort, not strict liability
b. Snyder v. Turk (p.38 Dr. pulls nurse towards surgical opening)
i. Physical harm is not needed for a battery
ii. “Offensive contact” is any contact that invades a reasonable sense of personal dignity
c. Cohen v. Smith (p.39patient says no men touch or see me naked)
i. A “Technical Battery”
1. Unable to locate in any legal resource
2. The professor’s term
ii. Extended Personality Doctrine†
1. If an un-consented to offensive contact is made
with an object closely identified with a person, it can be a construed as battery
2. Example of extended personality doctrine:
French ambassador had his cane kicked.
iii. “Offensive contact” takes into account: “Every human of adult years and of sound mind has a right to decide what is to be done with their own body.”
iv. Right of Autonomy†
1. A person has the right to refuse medical care
2. Court may intervene to save an innocent 3rd party
d. Leichtman v. Jacor Communications (p.42 non-smoker on radio)
i. Someone who commissions or incites a battery is equally liable
ii. An employer is not legally responsible for an intentional tort if it’s employees that does not facilitate of promote it’s business
e. Garrat v. Dailey (p.43 boy moved chair from under woman)
i. Intent – if an event may likely cause harm with a “substantial certainty”, and was done on purpose, it may be construed as intent to cause the harm
ii. If you do something on purpose that could likely hurt someone, if counts as intent for battery
f. Davis v. White (p.47 shot at A, hit B by mistake)
i. Transferred Intent Doctrine
1. Intent to commit an act is intent for claims against all resulting torts caused by that action
· Intend to shoot A but hit B
· Intend to punch A but also hit B
· Intend to scare A but hit A or B
2. Easier to transfer intent than prove negligence
ii. Most bankruptcy court will not allow the protection of debts owed on intentional injury claims
g. Walker v. Kelly (p.48 minor threw a rock and hit boy)
i. Rule of 7
1. A child under 7 is not capable of an intentional tort
2. NOT always followed
3. More modern, look at each child on an individual basis
h. Polmatier v. Russ (p.51 man beat with beer bottle and shot)
i. Insane persons are liable for their actions in civil tort actions (reasons: innocent person suffered a loss, deter fake defenses, incentive to restrain, potential for rich crazies depriving poor with out compensation)
ii. It is not necessary for the reasons and motives for forming intent to harm to be rational
3. For defenses see below
B. Assault
1. Definition
a. Assault is intentionally causing another to have apprehension of an immediate harmful or offensive contact.
b. A person is guilty of assault who
1. Intentionally
2. Causes another to have apprehension of
a. Immediate
i. harmful
2. or offensive
b. Contact
c. A tresspassory Tort
2. Cases
a. White v. Muniz (p.54 demented man batters nurse)
i. Dual Intent for Battery
1. Intent to Contact
2. Intend the contact to cause harm
3. a state law in Co. and some other states
ii. Single intent for Battery
1. Most states
2. if intend the action, intended result not important
b. Dickens v. Puryear (p. 57 beating and threat of death on man)
i. Statute of Limitations
1. The time frame for filling a claim
2. 1-3 years often for assault and/or battery
3. Often longer for emotional distress
ii. Threat of future harm NOT an assault
iii. “One of my favorite cases” –Chapman
c. Cullison v. Medley (p.61 called man pervert, reach for gun)
i. Assault is based on a perceived threat of the victim
ii. Words combined with action can reinforce or take away from an assault claim
d. Alteiri v. Colasso (p.61 threw rock to scare, hit him)
i. Transferred intent – intention to assault that leads to a touch is the same as a battery
ii. Extended Liability
1. Liability during the intentional committing of a tort extends to all damages
2. weather they are reasonably foreseeable or not.
C. False Imprisonment
1. Definition
a. False imprisonment occurs when a person confines another intentionally without lawful privilege against his consent within a limited area for any appreciable time, however short.
b. A person is guilty of false imprisonment if he:
1. Confines another
a. Intentionally
b. Without lawful privilege
c. Against his consent
2. For any appreciable time
a. however short
2. Cases
a. McCann v. Wal-Mart (p63 mother and children held by mistake)
i. Do not have to be physically restrained
1. Claiming false authority
2. Threats or perceived threats
ii. If you are not aware of the confinement, you must show actual harm to be compensated†
iii. Shop keepers privilege†
1. A property owner has the common law privilege of detaining against his will any person he believes has tortuously taken his property
2. Failure to prove such, leaves one liable
3. For defenses see below
D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
1. Definition
a. To recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, with extreme and outrageous conduct, and the actions caused the plaintiff emotion distress which was sever.
b. To recover from intentional infliction of emotional distress the plaintiff must prove:
1. The defendant acted
a. intentionally
b. or recklessly
2. The conduct was
a. extreme
b. and outrageous
3. The actions cause the plaintiff emotion distress
4. The emotional distress was sever
c. “The tort of outrage” :NOTE: in class mentioned it was often used for mishandling of the dead or mal-notification of deaths
2. Cases
a. GTE Southwest v. Bruce (p.498 rude and intimidating manager)
i. Employees are generally expected greater protection
ii. In Texas, employers guaranteed leeway
iii. Claim can stand alone as a tort
1. Parasitic – must be tact on, ie: pain and suffering or punitive damages
2. Stand Alone – can sue for…
b. Taylor v. Metzger (p.500 sheriff calls employee jungle bunny)
i. Racial slurs have a greater potential for harm than other insults
ii. Liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities
iii. People
rce intended to or likely to cause death or serious harm against another to protect property
ii. A person MAY use such force if the intrusion threatens death or serious bodily harm to occupiers of the premises
iii. A person MAY use such force if the trespasser was committing a felony of violence or a felony punishable by death.
iv. Cannot do remotely what you cannot do in person
a. Brown v. Martinez (p.84 Shot kid by accident protecting watermelons)
i. Intended to scare not shoot, doesn’t matter
ii.. Human safety is valued above property
iii. Hot Pursuit†
1.. An owner can recover goods forcibly if in hot pursuit
2.. Cannot recover at a later date forcibly
· Can use reasonable force to defend from the repo man
· Must go to court to regain
2. Consent
a. Reavis v. Slominsli (p. 87 mental woman sleeps with boss)
i. Contact is not a battery if consent is given
ii. 1) Incapacity of an adult plaintiff renders her consent ineffective only if her condition substantially impairs her capacity to understand and weigh the harm and risks of harm against the benefits flowing from the proposed conduct and 2) the plaintiff’s incapacity does not render her consent ineffective unless the defendant has knowledge of that incapacity.
iii. Consent can be modified
1. Narrowed or expanded
2. by consenter at anytime
b. Ashcraft v. King (p.89 Stipulation blood be from his family)s
i. Consent can have stipulations
ii. Can only violate patient consent with a good reasons
c. Kennedy v. Parrott (p.89 Woman has surgery on legs cysts)
i. Same Incision Rule
1. In medical circumstances, the consent shall be construed as general and the surgeon may extend the consent to remedy any abnormal or diseased conditions in the area of the original decision whenever he determines that correct surgical procedure dictates and requires such extension of the operation originally contemplated.
ii. Medical Informed Consent
1. A doctor is required to inform his patient of risks that may be involved with different choices or procedures
iii. Consent to Crime†
1. Not usually an effective defense against battery
2. Fickle rule applied at will
d. Doe v. Johnson (p.91 Magic has aids, should of known and told)
i. One who knows he has, or knows his likelihood of having a venereal disease has a responsibility to inform their sexual partners
C. Defenses to Trespass
1. Necessity
a. Surocco v. Geary (p.94 Blew up house to save city from fire)
i. Doctrine of Public Necessity
1. Natural law places public interests at the top
2. Do what is good for the masses
ii. Violation of due process (14th)?
b. Wegner v. Milwaukee Mutual (p.96 cops flashbanged a house)
i. Government taking clause outside of eminent domain
ii. Government damage to your property as a result of your lawless behavior, is not commensurable.
c. Ploof v. Putnam (p.99 Ploof docked on Putnam’s island)
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