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Advanced Torts
John Marshall Law School, Chicago
Hopkins, Kevin L.

 
Advanced Torts Hopkins Summer 2013
 
 
 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF STRICT LIABILITY
 
A. ANIMALS, ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES AND LIMITATIONS
·         Class 06/04 Pgs. 713-744
 
B. DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY
·         Class 06/06 Pgs. 745-768
– Negligence
·         MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.
Issue: Whether D owed duty of care to inspect the vehicle before released into the market.
 
– Warranty
·         Baxter v. Ford Motor Co. (Issue of Express Warranties Claim)
 
– Implied Warranty
·         Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.
 
– Strict Liability in Tort
·         Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (power tool purchased after the wife studied the brochure)–**decided two years before publishing of Restatement 2nd 402**
Issue: Is the P’s claim barred because it wasn’t filed property, hence warranty wouldn’t apply?
Holding: No…
Reasoning: P showed substantial evidence showing that the injuries were caused as a result of manufacturing defect.  However, D claimed that the claim was not filed timely as required by the Civil Code.
– Even if Plaintiff’s claim for breach of warranty were barred, the imposition of strict liability is appropriate in this case. From the evidence, it can be shown (i) that the manufacturer placed a product on the market; (ii) knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects; (iii) that proved to have a defect and (iv) that caused an injury. To establish liability, it is sufficient that Plaintiff was injured while using the Shopsmith in a way it was intended to be used, as a result of a defect in design and manufacture.
– The Court in this case finds that an apparently applicable statute will not bar recovery. Many of the products liability decisions tend to insure the protection of the consumer over that of manufacturers.
 
402àSpecial Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer.
·         Established a uniform definition of a defect.
·         But the courts realized that such uniform definition created troubles to, because there are several different defects: (1) manufacturing defect (one item), (2) defect in the product’s design (the whole line of products is defective), and (3) failure to warn.
o   Hence, in 1993, the 402 was re-written.
–PRODUCT DEFECT–
·         Restatement Third’s fundamental change was that instead of incorporating a uniform definition of a defect, they separated the three categories.
 
–PRODUCT DEFECTIVENESS–
1) MANUFACTURING DEFECT
·         When it departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing
2) DEFECTIVE IN DESIGN
·         When the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributors
3) INADEQUATE INSTRUCTION OR WARNINGS
·         When the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other distributors.
 
– Manufacturing Defect
·         Rix v. General Motors Corp. (Issue of manufacturing defect claim—lower standard of proof)
Issue: Whether the court correctly instructed the jury on bases of strict liability under a manufacturing defect theory.
Facts: (1) P, Michael Rix, was injured in a collision caused by GMC chassis-cab as a result of break failure. (2) Although both parties agree that the accident occurred because of brake failure, they disagree upon the notion of what caused the brake failure. (3) P argues that the tube broke because there was a manufacturing defect, and that GMC should have foreseen that by installing a dual system brakes, instead of single, his injuries would have been lessened, because there would be an extra braking power. (4) D argued that the brake tube was installed after the vehicle left the GMC assembly line, therefore, they should not be responsible, and that the dual brake system wouldn’t have prevented the accident.
Holding: The cou

ed, and the decision of trial court was reinstated.**
 
O’Brien v. Muskin Corp (above ground swimming pool case)
 
Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.
Facts: P worked in an environment where he was exposed to asbestos.  As a result he sustained was exposed some health problems.  He sued the manufacturers of asbestos for failure to adequately warn against the harm.
– Both parties argued whether admissibility of knowledge should be admitted into evidence.  D argued that if their knowledge was irrelevant, their liability would be absolute which undermines the doctrine of strict liability.  P on the other hand argued that knowledge infuses a negligence standard into strict liability which goes against the decision in Greenam v. Yuba Power Products.
Issue: Whether the court should allow to admit into evidence, evidence of the state of art?  Whether the producer in products liability case had actual or constructive knowledge of potential harm or risk, and failed to adequately warn the public?
Rule of Law: In order to be strictly liable, the producer must have knowledge – actual or constructive, of potential risk or danger before imposing strict liability for failure to warn.
State of art may be relevant to knowability, therefore, should be admissible, otherwise it would make the manufacturer virtual insurer of its product’s safety.
Procedural Context:
– Tr. Court ruled for D, and then granted a new trial.  Both parties argued admission of state of art evidence into the evidence (on appeal).
Holding: Yes, you can admit state of art evidence although it adds a negligence standard to a strict liability case.