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First Amendment
Drexel University School of Law
Cimino, Chapin Forsythe

 
Professor Cimino
Drexel University School of Law
First Amendment: Fall 2014
 
 
 
 
Ø  Values of Freedom of Expression –Emerson
1)      Individual self-fulfillment
2)      Marketplace of ideas; attainment of truth
3)      Participation in democratic process
4)      Safety valve
Ø  Analytical Framework Under The 1st Amendment
§  Argue which test applies then provide the rule statement.
§  Start with restriction on speech/conduct.
§  Does it target toward pure conduct, or does the conduct have expressive value? 
§  Speech vs. Conduct
·         Conduct: look to intentà “pure conduct” vs. “expressive conduct” – O’Brien Test
·         Speech: look to content and determine whether it is expressive.
§  Does the restriction facially target expression?
·         Yesà Content-Based
·         Noà Content-Neutral
1)      If CNà Does speech belong to an excluded category? (protected vs. unprotected)
a.       Yesà Unprotected; No 1st A. defense- Petitioner must argue an expressive element to the speech/conduct.
b.      Noà Speech is fully protected.
2)      Is it CB as applied? à Look to the secondary effects/gov’s intent
a.       Yesà Unprotected- lower standard of judicial scrutiny; deference to legislature
b.      Noà Protected- strict standard of scrutiny
·         Content vs. Conduct
·         A regulation that prohibits the expression of specific ideas, or content, is less likely to be upheld than a regulation on conduct whereas expression is incidental to speech.
o   Conductà The government’s interest must outweigh any expressive value to the speaker.
o   Contentà It is presumptively unconstitutional for the government to burden speech solely on the basis of its content.
§  Historical trend: Speech restrictiveà Speech protective
 
I.            Content-Based Regulations
 
      Unprotected Content-Based Restrictions  
§  Content-based restrictions on expression are presumptively unconstitutional. However, the First Amendment does not protect certain categories of content-based restrictions. The restriction must be narrowly tailored to achieve a government compelling interest, which outweighs any potential expressive value to the speaker.
§  Statutes that prohibit overthrowing the government are facially valid bc it’s considered to fall within the gov’s regulatory authority
§  Excluded expression that has little or no value in the marketplace of ideas; opinions are very distinguishable from facts in the search for truth.
§  Must be either speech or conduct with an expressive element to assert a 1st A. defense.
§  Viewpoint Neutralityà The government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.
 
A.     Incitement To Imminent Lawlessness & “Clear and Present Danger” Doctrine
§  Rule: The First Amendment does not completely bar the government from regulating expression. [Schenck] The government can prohibit expression advocating unlawful action when it: 1) intentionally produces or incites imminent unlawful action, and; 2) will likely produce or incite such unlawful action. [Brandenburg] However, the government must narrowly define the prohibited expression. [Hess] §  Schenck v. United States (1919) – *CONDUCT- Espionage Act convictions for dispersing leaflets encouraging people to resist military service; proximity and degree of possible harm posed sufficient threat of a CPD
§  Rule: Gov not barred from proscribing speech under 1st A. so long as it posed threat of CPD.
§  Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) – Overturned conviction of KKK leader who made speech calling for revenge against the gov for suppressing Caucasians.
§  Rule: The 1st A. does not protect expression that intentionally incites lawless action that is both imminent and likely to occur.  
§  Hess v. Indiana (1973) – Discon overturned bc D’s threat wasn't directed at anyone specific.
§  Rule: Must inquire into whether expression can be objectively understood to incite unlawful action.
·         Abrams v. United States (1919) – Russian anarchists convicted under Espionage Act for distributing fliers denouncing the US; tendency and reasonably probable effect to cause a CPD.
·         Dissent (Holmes): Gov should not prohibit expressive unless threat of CPD is imminent; ultimate good achieved in marketplace of ideas; best test for truth is to be accepted through power of thought.
·         Gitlow v. New York (1925) – Upheld conviction a NY criminal anarchy statute; no 1st A defense.
·         Rule: State legislatures have discretion to determine what constitutes sufficient harm or danger as to justify prohibition on speech. Incorporates the application of the 1st A to the states through the 14th A.
·         Dennis v. United States (1951) – Convicted under Smith Act for willfully conspiring to organize the Communist Party and overthrow the gov; although Ds’ likelihood of success improbable, mere threat of violent insurrection is CPD grave enough to justify it gov’s interest in the proscription on expression.
·         Holding: State given more deference to regulate expression so long as the se

depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable law, and; 3) the material, taken as a whole, lacks any serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. [Miller] ·         Miller v. California (1973) – Modern Test
1)      Whether the average person, in applying contemporary community standards, would find that the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest;
2)      Whether the material depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable law;
3)      Whether the material, taken as a whole, lacks any serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
·         Roth v. United States (1957) – D published obscene materials to sell for his mail order business.
·         Rule: The First Amendment does not protect obscenity. The standard for obscenity is to determine whether the material taken as a whole predominantly appeals to the prurient interest.
·         Ginsberg v. New York (1968) – Upheld NY law banning sale of porn magazines to minors.
·         Rule: Deference given to state police power to regulate obscenity for minors.
·         Stanley v. Georgia (1969) – *Obscenity Safe Harbor
·         Rule: The state does not have the broad power to regulate obscenity in one’s private home.
·         Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton (1973) – Gave legislature more deference to regulate obscenity in these adult theaters as a commercial regulation on public accommodationsà the fundamental right to privacy safe harbor [Stanley] does not apply.
§  Problems With Obscenity Doctrine
·         Miller test does not address the issue of harm or proof of harmà deference given to the legislative and police power to define and regulate obscenity –Ginsberg, Paris Adult Theater
·         Test does not cover other potentially obscene material that aren’t erotic/sexual; but just violent, gross, distasteful, etc. Furthermore, such material may even fall outside the Miller obscenity standard.