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Torts
Charleston School of Law
Mensel, Robert E.

TORTS OUTLINE
________________________________________________________________________Introduction to torts
 
-Original rule of law for imposing liability in a tort did not require intent by the tortfeasor (Anonymous, 1466). If the tortfeasor damages property/person of another (regardless if there is no intent, negligence, or fault) he is guilty of “trespass” (battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to land, and trespass to chattels).
 
-In Weaver v. Ward, 1616, the court recognized an affirmative defense from the D, who had accidentally shot a colleague during military exercises. The court recognizes: “I was mandated to be there and I used ordinary care” or “I voluntarily committed a lawful act, and I used extraordinary care.”
-Court also held a defendant can be without liability if he can prove lack of fault (Using the above affirmative defenses). D, can however, still be liable for unintentional “trespass.”
 
-Brown v. Kendall, 1850, held that a D is guilty of trespass if he committed the act intentionally or if the P can prove the D was negligent in committing the act.
-Burden of Proof- Whichever side that exerts a claim to the court has the burden of proving it.
-Cohen v. Petty, 1933, held that proof of negligence is based on foreseeablity of the injury (D not liable to passenger for getting sick while driving and wrecking) because there is “no reason for the D to have anticipated the ailment.”
-Spano v. Perini Corp, 1969, held a D does not need to be liable of trespass if in strict liability (D blasted city land, debris damaged P’s property). D is strictly liable because of the nature of his work.
 
I. Intentional Torts
Battery
 
1. Volitional Act
            – Conscious decision (Not while sleeping or having a seizure).
2. Intent: Intended to cause (contact, the outcome of the action, fall out of the chair), or there was substantial certainty (reasonable man) that the action could cause the outcome of the action.
-In Garrat v. Daily, 1955, D was a child who pulled the chair out from under the P, causing her to fall. Proof of intent to make her fall out of the chair was not there. Question is whether D knew with “substantial certainty” that the P would try to sit in the chair.
-Garret also held age doesn’t matter. What matters is whether the D is capable (knowledge, experience, capacity, understanding) the outcome of his comprehending his actions àExpert testimony. Same idea goes for crazy people (McGuire v. Almy, 1937). As long as the D intended to do the action, he is liable for battery.
 
-Mistake dose not negate intent (Ranson v. Kitner, 1889) – “Mistake” is different from “accident.” Mistake is Ranson, he intended to kill the animal; mistakenly thought the animal was a wolf, not the P’s dog.
-Intent can be transferred. D trying to hit a wrongdoer and missing and hitting an innocent bystander is still battery because the D was intending to hit someone (Talmage v. Smith, 1894).
3. Harmful or Offensive Contact: Must be contact with the D or an extension of D; can be direct or indirect.
            -Contact must imminently happen from action.
-Harmful- (Injury)
-Offensive- Personal indignity is the essence of battery. Any contact with a D (Or things attached, in possession, or inside of) in an offensive, rude, angry, or insulting manner, regardless of harm, constitutes battery (Fisher v. Carrousel, 1967)
-Voluntary Intoxication doesn’t negate.
-The circumstances of the “contact” must be observed to decide if it was offensive by the ordinary person standard. Duty D owes others can also be looked at/ affirmative defense (Wallace v. Rosen, 2002).
-Must be understood that we live in a “crowded world,” sometimes contact is inevitable (Wallace v. Rosen).
*Regardless of the foreseeabilty of the outcome of the harmful/offensive contact (Person was hurt or insulted more than intended), defendant is liable for all in battery.
-Observe Spivey v. Batigula, 1972 – this case was decided wrong attempting to resolve a wrong. This case was a battery, even though D did not foresee such an injury arising from his offensive contact.
 
­­­­­­­­­­­­­­Assault
An unlawful attempt to commit a battery (offer to touch); incomplete for some reason or intervening cause (I de Se et ux v. W de S, 1348, Great-Grandparent of assault cases). Must also create a well-founded fear/expectation in the P of an imminent battery. Must be a present ability to effectuate the attempt.
 
1. Volitional Act
-Must be conscious (Not while sleeping or having a seizure).
2. Intent
-The act must be intended to cause a purpose (harmful or offensive contact). Or there must be substantial certainty that the act could cause a battery.
(SAME ELEMENTS OF BATTERY)
3. Apprehension (Fear of an imminent battery) on the part of the assaulted
-The P must be aware that an assault is occurring (P.39, n.6: Not assault when P didn’t realize D had gun pointed at him w/ intent to shoot.)
-Words, no matter how threatening, never are an assault – Even if accompanied by a threatening gesture.
            -Unless the words cause harm. For instance- “Look out there is a rattlesnake behind you” (when there isn’t one). Or – imminent danger: “Give me all your money or I will kill you.”
-Never assault when gesture is conditional. Except when the condition creates imminent danger.
-A threat of battery constitutes assault; however, the threat must be imminent. For instance, D cannot tell you that he is going to beat you up in 6 months. However, if a person comes at you, says he is going to blow your brains out, reaches for his pocket, but is stopped, it is an assault. The assault had begun and an intervening cause stopped it.
*The D must have been physically capable of carrying out the battery (Western Union v. Hill, 1933).
 
False Imprisonment
 
1. Volitional Act
2. Intent- Purpose to the act or substantial certainty that FI will occur.
3. Apprehension- P must know that he is being imprisoned (Pavi v. City of Kingston,
1977). *Not being able to remember the act doesn’t mean he was unaware. Howeve

-A pre-existing condition does not apply unless it is proven the condition became severely worse b/c of the wrongful act (Harris v. Jones, 1977).
 
*The emotional distress standard is different (doesn’t have to be as severe) when the D is a servant or employee of a carrier, hotel, theater, or when there is an existence of a special relationship arising contract or the inherent nature of a non-competitive public utility.
 
-Injuring a family member or loved one in front of another, causing ED, is IIOED when: 1. The D hurt the family member to cause the distress on the onlooker; 2. Or the P can prove the D was substantially certain the beating would cause ED. (Facts and Circumstances along with reasonable man) (Taylor v. Vallelunga, 1959, n.1).
 
(Affirmative Defenses) – Always must be pleaded and proved by D.
Consent
 
Generally:
-Must be the act of a rational, competent person, intoxication, insanity, and minority may invalidate consent (consent ineffective if P is incapable pf expressing rational will).
-States are torn whether consent is valid to illegal acts.
-Scope of consent may not be exceeded.
-Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. (1979): Player sued another player for battery b/c of cheap shot in a game. Affirmative D was the player consented to the blow by playing in a game that is rough in nature. However, the scope of the consent was exceeded b/c the rules and customs of the NFL explicitly denounce striking another player, especially when the game is not in play. Not in the scope of the game, so not in the scope of consent.
-Mohr v. Williams (1905): Patient went to doctor to have ear operated on. During procedure, doctor decided nothing was wrong with that ear, and decided to operate on the other. The operation was a success. Patient sued Doctor for battery. Doctors actions were outside of the scope of consent patient had agreed to. Moral: Broad-based Consent Form.
-Consent is invalid if obtained by fraud or misrepresentation. DeMay v. Roberts (1881) (unqualified doctor’s assistant helped give birth)
 
Express Consent
-A clear expression of specific consent to contract, confinement, or other conduct by D that would otherwise be tortious.
-Required for medical treatment. Unless it is an emergency (Four Prong Test):
1.The patient is unable to give consent (unconscious, intoxicated, mentally ill, incompetent; 2. Risk of serious harm if treatment is delayed; 3. A reasonable