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Torts
Charleston School of Law
Anastopoulo, Constance

Torts
Anastopoulo
Spring 2010
 
*Vosburg v. Putney (1891)
**The beginning of assault and battery (the “headwaters of common law”)
The action was brought to recover damages for an assault and battery.  Injury was caused by a kick inflicted by ∆ (age 11) upon the leg of the Π (age 14), a little below the knee.  However, the injured child did not even feel kick.
Issue:  Whether the victim must prove that the alleged wrongdoer intended to do him harm in an action to recover damages for an alleged assault and battery.
Rule:  To recover damages for an alleged assault and battery, the victim must only show either that the alleged wrongdoer had an unlawful intention to produce harm (i.e., an unlawful intention in committing the act which occurred) or that he committed an unlawful act.
Rationale: If the intended act is unlawful, the intention to commit it must necessarily be unlawful.
Implied license of the playground:
If the kicking had happened on the playground then the outcome may have been different. 
But since school was in order when the kick occurred, the actions of the ∆ are considered unlawful.  Thus the intention under the battery law is established. 
The wrongdoer in an assault and battery case is liable for all injuries resulting directly from the wrongful act, whether they could or could not have been foreseen by him.
Class Notes:
Assault: The threat or attempt to strike another, whether successful or not, provided the target is aware of the danger.  The assaulter must be reasonably capable of carrying through the attack.
Assault based on no intent to harm, however will be responsible if act is “unlawful”
Battery: The actual intentional striking of someone, with intent to harm, or in a “rude and insolent manner” even if the injury is slight.  Negligent or careless unintentional contact is not battery.
To commit an intentional tort must have intent.
In this case, the ∆ knew act that he was committing… just didn’t know extent of injury that it would cause.
While battery requires intent, the prevailing tort definition does not require intent to harm.  It is only necessary that the ∆ intend to cause either harmful or offensive contact. 
 
*Garrett v. Dailey (1955)
The ∆, a 5 year-old kid, pulled a chair out from under the Π as she was sitting. 
Even if the ∆ did not desire that she hit the ground, if he knew with substantial certainty that the Π would attempt to sit down where the chair had been, then battery can be established. 
The court reasoned that the ∆ made the conscious act of moving the chair. 
*An intent with reasonable knowledge that damage or injury will occur is enough for assault and battery.
Don’t have to have contact to commit battery (in certain situations).
 
Transfer of Intent
Transferred intent applies when the ∆ intends to commit a tort against one person but instead
(a) commits a different tort against that person;
(b) commits the same tort as intended but against a different person; or
(c) commits a different tort against a different person.
The intent to commit a tort against one person is transferred to the other tort or to the injured person for purpose of establishing liability.
Limited to:
assault;
battery;
false imprisonment;
trespass to land; and
trespass to chattels.
 
Talmage v. Smith (1894)
Under the circumstances, the fact that the injury resulted to another than was intended does not relieve the ∆ from responsibility.
If you intend to commit assault against one person but end up battering another person, you are liable.
 
Trespass to Land
 
Dougherty v. Stepp (1835)
∆ entered Π’s property and surveyed a part of it, but without marking any trees or cutting bushes.
Issue: Whether a ∆ is liable for any entry onto the land of a Π although he created no tangible damage.
Rule: Every unauthorized (and therefore unlawful) entry onto the land of another person is a trespass. (Strict liability rule)
Any damage to the property such as the marking of trees only changes the degree of harm, as it is the entry alone which constitutes the trespass.
 
Trespass to Chattels
The intentional interference with the right of possession of personal property. 
The ∆’s acts must intentionally damage the chattel, deprive the possessor of its use for a substantial period of time, or totally dispossess the chattel from the victim. 
 
Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003)
∆, a former Intel employee, sent e-mails criticizing Intel’s employment practices to numerous current employees.  ∆’s communications caused neither physical damage nor functional disruption to the company’s computers, nor did they at any time deprive Intel of the use of its computers.
Intel claimed that by communicating with its employees over the company’s e-mail system the ∆ committed the tort of trespass to chattels.
Rule: Trespass to chattels (movable or transferable property) is not given legal protection unless there is harm to the physical condition, quality, or value of the chattel.
There may have been resulting harm in Hamidi, but there wasn’t any interference with the good itself.
Holding:  The consequential economic damage Intel claims to have suffered (loss of productivity caused by employees reading and reacting to ∆’s messages and company efforts to block the messages) is not an injury to the company’s interest in its computers- which worked as intended and were unharmed by the communications.
 
B. Emotional and Dignitary Harms
 
Assault
Assault occurs when the ∆’s acts intentionally create a reasonable apprehension of immediate harmful or offensive contact to plaintiff’s person.
The ∆ must desire or be substantially certain that her action will cause the apprehension of immediate harmful or offensive contact.
The victim must perceive that harmful or offensive contact is about to happen to him. 
For assault to be actionable the victim’s apprehension must be of imminent harmful or offensive contact. 
 

erely prevented from proceeding further in the direction he desired to go.  Π brought suit for false imprisonment.
Issue: Whether an action for false imprisonment may be maintained where there is an available way out.
Imprisonment is something more than the mere loss of the freedom to go wherever one pleases; it includes the notion of restraint within some limits defined by a will or power exterior to our own.
 
Coblyn v. Kennedy’s Inc. (1971)
Π was detained by an employee of ∆ who suspected Π of shoplifting.
Rule 1: It is false imprisonment if a man is restrained of his personal liberty by fear of a personal difficulty. 
A genuine restraint is sufficient to be imprisonment; and any demonstration of physical power which, it appears can be avoided only by submission, operates to constitute imprisonment.
Rule 2: A shopkeeper must have “reasonable” grounds to believe that a person has shoplifted before he may detain that person in a reasonable manner for a reasonable length of time.
 
Defenses to False Imprisonment:
Necessity (i.e. school bus driver’s obligation to maintain order on bus)
Consent (i.e. miner’s working in a mine)
 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: Extreme and Outrageous Conduct
·         Seekings prefers § 46, where conduct must be so outrageous to cause emotional distress.
 
§ 46. Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
(a) to a member of such person’s immediate family who is present at the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress results in bodily harm.
 
Wilkinson v. Downtown (England 1897)
As part of a practical joke, ∆ told Π that her husband had been severely injured.
Issue: Whether extreme and outrageous conduct which caused physical harm is a valid cause of action.
Rule: Where a person willfully does an act which is calculated to cause physical harm and in fact does cause physical harm there is a good cause of action.